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This study shows that analyst research benefits from the sharing of information about 
economically connected industries among colleagues. Measuring the intensity of potential 
information sharing with the level of economic connection between an analyst’s industry and her 
colleagues’ industries, we find that it is positively correlated with an analyst’s earnings forecast 
accuracy, stock recommendation profitability, coverage breadth, and report frequency after 
controlling for other determinants including broker or analyst fixed effects. We also find that 
analysts are more likely to issue reports when highly connected colleagues produce information. 
We show that sharing information with colleagues covering downstream (upstream) industries 
benefits an analyst’s revenue (expense) forecasts, and that an analyst’s performance improves 
(deteriorates) after an economically connected colleague joins (departs) the brokerage firm. 
Cross-sectionally, information sharing benefits an analyst’s research more when her colleagues 
have higher research quality, and when she and her colleagues have stronger social ties. Finally, 
we find that investors recognize the benefits of information sharing: they react more strongly to 
research reports issued by analysts whose covered industries have a higher level of economic 
connection to those of colleagues, and are more likely to vote such analysts as All-Stars.  
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Cross-Industry Information Sharing and Analyst Performance 
1. Introduction 
In this study, we identify a new channel through which analysts collect information, namely 
the sharing of information about economically connected industries among colleagues.1 We 
examine the effects of this sharing on an analyst’s research quality and productivity, and on the 
market’s recognition of her research performance. Our findings show that an analyst’s research 
quality and productivity are both positively correlated with the level of economic connection 
between her industry and those covered by her colleagues working for the same brokerage house, 
suggesting that information sharing among colleagues is beneficial to analyst research 
performance. These findings contribute to the literature, which has primarily focused on the roles 
of analysts as industry specialists (e.g., Boni and Womack, 2006; Kadan et al., 2012; Parsons et 
al., 2019). We, however, argue that cross-industry information sharing among colleagues is an 
important analyst activity that has been underexplored. Investigating the activity of cross-
industry information sharing furthers our understanding of the sources of analysts’ information, 
the economic determinants of their performance, and the diffusion of this information in the 
market.2  
The practice of information sharing has been observed anecdotally, as this description 
concerning Goldman Sachs (Groysberg, 2010): 
If a chemicals analyst noticed that plastic prices had dipped unexpectedly, for example, he 
would inform colleagues who covered industries that could be affected by the price differential. 
The beneficial effect on research quality was enormous. “When a company reported, the analyst 
would think horizontally across the analytical staff about who would be impacted,” Einhorn 
[head of Goldman Sachs global research] explained. “And that provided a bond between 
various analysts.” 
 
                                                        
1 We use “analysts working for the same brokerage house” and “colleagues” interchangeably in this paper.  
2 For brevity, we use “information sharing” as shorthand for “information sharing among colleagues covering 
economically connected industries.”  
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Brokerage firms’ organizational mechanisms for promoting colleague collaboration and such 
activities’ benefits for analyst rankings are further noted in this description from Lehman 
Brothers (Groysberg, 2010): 
Balog and other Lehman research executives pushed analysts to include collaborative work 
in their annual business plans. That way, they came to understand that team-specific 
collaborative achievements would help determine their yearly bonus... When Lehman Brothers 
was rated the best research department on Wall Street in the 1990s, its analysts benefited from 
team-based research processes that heightened their awareness of developments in related 
sectors and their ability to evaluate such developments knowledgeably...  
 
Although information sharing among colleagues has long been recognized in practice, little 
research has focused on this activity. In our study, we document and examine this activity, its 
determinants, and its implications for analyst performance and market perception.  
There are several forces driving information sharing among colleagues covering 
economically connected industries. The first is the economic connection among industries, 
specifically between supplier and customer industries. We posit that any shocks to commodity 
prices, consumer demand, or technological advancement should ripple through the layers of the 
supply chain (Acemoglu et al., 2012; Barrot and Sauvagnat, 2016). Information impacting one 
industry thus has value implications for firms in both its upstream and downstream industries 
(Menzly and Ozbas, 2010). The second force is the need for analysts to specialize to gain a 
competitive advantage. Analysts face intense competition in discovering and interpreting new 
information and providing industry knowledge, and specialization or in-depth study is then 
necessary for them to exploit commonalities within firms in the same industry (Kini et al., 2009; 
Parsons et al., 2019). An analyst with colleagues who specialize in upstream and downstream 
industries can more efficiently obtain information from her colleagues instead of gathering it on 
her own. The third force is the intrinsic motivation to collaborate, which can be manifested in 
feelings of competence, self-efficacy, and altruism (Osterloh and Frey, 2000; Lin, 2007). 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3502820




Recognizing the benefits of information sharing for both employees and the firm, organizations 
often encourage collaboration through formal and informal mechanisms (Tsai, 2002; Inkpen and 
Tsang, 2005). For example, brokerage houses might co-locate colleagues covering related 
industries, organize conferences to bring colleagues together, and acknowledge collaborative 
efforts in performance evaluations (Hill and Teppert, 2010).  
Although information sharing yields a number of benefits to analysts, they also have reasons 
not to collaborate. First, because analysts in the same brokerage house must share the year-end 
bonus pool, they have incentives to outperform each other (Groysberg et al., 2011; Yin and 
Zhang, 2014). These analysts also compete for promotions, such as being promoted to research 
executive (Wu and Zang, 2009; Bradley et al., 2019). Prior research shows that such intrafirm 
tournament incentives can impede knowledge sharing and can even lead to sabotage among 
employees (Bonner et al., 2000; Brown and Heywood, 2009; Harbring and Irlenbusch, 2011). 
Research also shows that social comparisons and resulting feelings of envy can lead to similar 
consequences (Nickerson and Zenger, 2008; Tai et al., 2012; Charness et al., 2014). Social 
comparisons are more likely to occur among colleagues because they work in close proximity 
and have frequent interactions (Festinger, 1954; Kulik and Ambrose, 1992; Kilduff et al., 2010).  
Several recent studies investigate the effects of information sharing among analysts and their 
colleagues and find evidence that analysts learn from colleagues who likely do not view them as 
competitors, such as directors of research, macroeconomists, quantitative analysts, debt analysts, 
and mentors (Hugon et al., 2016; Birru et al., 2019; Do and Zhang, 2019; Hugon et al., 2019). 
Hwang et al. (2019) find that analysts obtain information from colleagues when their covered 
firms are involved in an M&A. Our study differs from these in two aspects. First, we examine 
the practice of information sharing among those whom analysts might deem competitors. For the 
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reasons discussed above, whether such activity takes place remains an empirical question. 
Second, the nature of the information being shared differs from that previously examined. We 
take advantage of the variations in industry economic connections to explore the sharing of 
industry information among colleagues who analyze upstream and downstream industries.  
In our study, we predict that the sharing of industry-related information among colleagues 
improves analysts’ performance. To measure the intensity of potential information sharing, we 
utilize the extent to which an analyst’s industry is economically connected to the industries 
covered by her colleagues.3 We posit that if information sharing does take place, it should benefit 
the analyst’s research performance more when there is a higher level of economic connection 
between her industry and her colleagues’ industries.   
We use data from the Benchmark Input-Output Surveys of the Bureau of Economic Analysis 
(hereafter, BEA) to estimate the economic connection among industries. Specifically, we 
measure the level of reliance between industries that are suppliers and customers (i.e., the sum of 
one industry’s input commodities made by the other, and its output commodities used by the 
other). To measure the connection between an analyst and her colleagues, we aggregate the 
reliance between the analyst’s industry and those of her colleagues. During our sample period of 
1982 to 2017, we find the average connection between an analyst and her colleagues to be 
economically significant at 69.8%; that is, the industries covered by her colleagues have a 
combined value of input and output commodities that amounts to 69.8% of her industry’s total 
output.  
                                                        
3 Information sharing likely occurs through unobservable channels, such as face-to-face discussion, phone calls, text 
messages, or email exchanges. Accordingly, researchers have limited ability to document how and when such 
communications take place. We attempt to detect information sharing by documenting its varying effect on analysts’ 
research performance due to different levels of economic connectedness among colleagues’ industries. If such 
activity does not occur, the level of economic connectedness with colleagues’ industries should not explain analysts’ 
research performance.  
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Using this measure, we find evidence that information sharing among colleagues improves 
analyst research performance. First, we find that both earnings forecast accuracy and stock 
recommendation profitability are positively correlated with analysts’ industry connection with 
colleagues, after we control for broker fixed effects and other factors that the literature has found 
can explain research quality. This finding suggests that colleagues share information useful in 
analyst research from their own industries. Second, we find that analysts with a higher level of 
industry connection with their colleagues cover larger firms and issue reports more frequently. 
This suggests that information sharing among colleagues lowers an analyst’s information 
acquisition costs and increases her productivity. Third, we find that analysts with colleagues who 
cover highly connected industries are more likely to issue reports around the date when their 
connected colleagues issue reports, which provides further direct evidence of colleagues sharing 
information. 
Industry connection is higher for analysts working for larger brokerage firms because they 
have more colleagues. However, it is unlikely that our findings are driven by larger brokerage 
firms’ general resources because we include broker fixed effects in all of our empirical analyses. 
We thus show that analysts with more industry connections with colleagues exhibit higher 
research quality and productivity among those who work for the same broker and thus have 
similar access to various general brokerage resources, including working with the same research 
director, team of quantitative analysts, macroeconomists (Hugon et al., 2016; Birru et al., 2019; 
Bradley et al., 2019), and other support staff (Mikhail et al., 1997; Clement, 1999; Gao et al., 
2019).4 To further address the potential endogeneity concern such as brokerage firms assigning 
                                                        
4 Arguably, having colleagues who cover economically connected industries can also be considered a broker 
resource. However, throughout this paper, we use “broker resource” to refer to other types of broker support that are 
distinct from the sharing of upstream/downstream industry-related information. 
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more capable analyst to better connected industries, we conduct a number of additional tests. 
First, we rerun our analyses, replacing broker fixed effects with analyst fixed effects, and 
separately using a change specification. Our results continue to suggest that for a given analyst, 
her performance is better when she has greater industry connectedness with colleagues. Second, 
we replicate our empirical analyses using a matched sample design in which we match each 
analyst with a high level of industry connection to another analyst with a low level of industry 
connection from the same broker-year and of similar industry experience and coverage breadth. 
The results indicate that analysts who work for the same broker in the same year, and who have 
similar experience and coverage, perform better when their colleagues’ industries are more 
economically connected to theirs. Third, we rerun our analyses and separately measure the 
colleagues’ industry connection of upstream versus downstream industries, and find upstream 
connectedness benefits expense forecasts but not revenue forecasts, and downstream 
connectedness benefits revenue forecasts but not expense forecasts. Last, we examine the effect 
of colleague turnover, which is arguably an exogenous change in information sharing. We find 
that analyst performance improves after the brokerage house hires an industry-connected 
colleague, and deteriorates when an industry-connected colleague departs. The results of these 
empirical tests indicate that analyst research benefits from information sharing among colleagues 
covering economically connected industries, and that this effect cannot be explained by general 
brokerage resources, analysts’ selection of a particular brokerage house, or brokerage firms 
assigning better analysts to more connected industries.  
We next examine the cross-sectional variation in the effect of information sharing on analyst 
performance. We show evidence that the effect of information sharing is more salient when an 
analyst has colleagues of higher research ability (measured by forecast accuracy, 
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recommendation profitability, and industry experience), and when she and her colleagues have 
stronger social ties (measured by longer relationship, working in the same city, or graduated 
from the same school), which imply more frequent informal contact, smoother collaboration, and 
more willingness to share information.  
Finally, we use investor responses to analyst reports and their analyst All-Star rankings in 
Institutional Investor (hereafter II) (Groysberg et al., 2011) to examine whether investors 
recognize the benefit of analysts’ information sharing. The results from these analyses show that, 
after we control for analyst forecast performance, productivity, and other economic factors, 
analysts with higher industry connection to their colleagues elicit stronger investor reaction to 
their research reports and are more likely to be ranked as II All-Stars. This effect is economically 
significant: a one standard deviation increase in information sharing increases analysts’ odds of 
being ranked as II All-Stars by 11.8% (1.7% relative to the unconditional probability of 14.4%). 
These results are consistent with investors recognizing the benefit of information sharing to 
analysts’ industry knowledge, written reports, and idea generation.  
Our study extends the research on financial analysts, as previously the focus has been on the 
role of analysts as industry specialists (e.g., Clement, 1999; Jacob et al., 1999; Piotroski and 
Roulstone, 2004; Boni and Womack, 2006; Kini et al., 2009), that they produce information that 
is highly specialized along industry lines, and that they contribute to information segmentation in 
the market (e.g., Menzly and Ozbas, 2010; Parsons et al., 2019).5 We, however, show that 
analysts covering economically connected industries share information, which benefits their 
research quality and productivity. Thus, our findings contribute to the literature by revealing the 
                                                        
5 Menzly and Ozbas (2010) argue that cross-predictability in a limited-information model requires the assumption 
that informed investors specialize. They address this assumption by presenting evidence for the specialization of 
equity analysts and money managers. Similarly, Parsons et al. (2019) use analyst industry specialization to explain 
the geographic lead-lag effect in firms. 
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role of analysts in the gradual diffusion of information in the market. They can both specialize in 
their own industries and facilitate the efficient flow of information across economically 
connected industries.  
Second, our study contributes to the recent literature on learning from colleagues (e.g., 
Hugon et al., 2016; Birru et al., 2019; Bradley et al., 2019; Do and Zhang, 2019; Hugon et al., 
2019; Hwang et al., 2019). This research finds that analysts benefit from in-house colleagues 
who are macroeconomists, quantitative researchers, research directors, and debt analysts; II All-
Star colleagues covering the same industry; and colleagues covering the other company in an 
M&A transaction. We contribute to this research by documenting a new type of information that 
analysts share with colleagues, which is related to upstream and downstream industries, and that 
varies even among analysts working for the same broker. Our evidence reveals that analysts may 
even collaborate with peers who they regard as competitors.  
On a broader level, our paper contributes to the literature by identifying a new determinant of 
analyst coverage decisions, forecast performance, and investor recognition (Mikhail et al., 1997; 
Clement, 1999; Emery and Li, 2009; Givoly et al., 2009; Bradshaw et al., 2013). We show that 
the costs of specializing in one industry can be mitigated by information sharing with colleagues 
who cover upstream and downstream industries. Our findings also suggest to brokerage houses 
that encouraging information sharing on industries along the supply chain can improve analysts’ 
research quality and productivity, and enhance their reputation among investors. In addition, our 
paper provides guidance to investors by helping them identify analysts who possess better cross-
industry knowledge and superior research quality.  
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2. Hypotheses development  
Our study is based on the notion that analysts covering economically connected industries 
have incentives to share information. Information from one industry has been found to have 
value implications for both its upstream and downstream industries (Menzly and Ozbas, 2010; 
Huang and Kale, 2013; Aobdia et al., 2014). Shocks to commodity prices, consumer demand, or 
production, and technological advancements ripple through the supply chain (Acemoglu et al., 
2012; Barrot and Sauvagnat, 2016), leading to highly correlated fundamentals for companies in 
closely connected industries (Cohen and Frazzini, 2008; Menzly and Ozbas, 2010).  
Not surprisingly, institutional investors value industry knowledge in analyst reports 
(Bradshaw, 2011; Brown et al., 2015; Lowengard, 2017), so analysts face intense competition in 
discovering and interpreting industry information (Huang et al., 2018). Analyst industry 
knowledge can come from experience, as most analysts have previously worked in the industry 
they cover (Bradley et al., 2017). Financial analysts typically specialize in one industry (Boni 
and Womack, 2006; Kadan et al., 2012), presumably to exploit commonalities within their 
covered firms (Clement, 1999; Gilson et al., 2001).6 Such specialization incentivizes analysts to 
obtain information on related industries from their colleagues. Prior studies have shown that 
analysts rely on colleagues for macroeconomic news (Hugon et al., 2016) and common anomaly 
mispricing signals (Birru et al., 2019).7 In addition, employees have intrinsic motivations to 
share information with colleagues, including feelings of competence and self-efficacy, and 
enjoyment in helping others (Osterloh and Frey, 2000; Lin, 2007).  
                                                        
6 Prior studies also examine country-level specialization by analysts (e.g., Kini et al., 2009; Sonney, 2009). We use 
I/B/E/S analysts covering U.S. firms in our sample. The vast majority of these analysts are industry specialists and 
do not follow firms in other countries (Kini et al. 2009).  
7 Prior research also examines analysts’ sharing of information with non-colleagues (e.g., Cohen et al., 2010; Green 
et al., 2014; Fang and Huang, 2017; Gu et al., 2019). Such sharing activities can improve an analyst’s relationships 
and expand her social connections, leading to better career outcomes (Li et al., 2016).  
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Organizations recognize the benefits of knowledge sharing and facilitate it through both 
formal and informal mechanisms (Tsai, 2002; Inkpen and Tsang, 2005). Anecdotal evidence 
indicates that brokerage houses co-locate analysts who cover related industries, organize 
conferences for firms in related industries, acknowledge collaboration in analyst performance 
evaluations (Hill and Teppert, 2010), and host corporate retreats and other social bonding events.  
Although sharing information has its benefits, analysts have reasons not to share with 
colleagues, particularly those they regard as potential competitors for compensation or promotion 
opportunities. In terms of compensation, analysts receive a year-end bonus that comprises a 
substantial proportion of their annual pay (Groysberg et al., 2011). This is allocated from the 
broker’s annual bonus pool (Yin and Zhang, 2014; Brown et al., 2015). Such zero-sum games 
can encourage individualism and reduce coordination ( Lazear, 1989; Baiman and Rajan, 1995; 
Berger et al., 2013; Arnold et al., 2019). In terms of promotion opportunities, analysts compete 
with colleagues for internal promotions to positions such as research executive and director of 
research (Wu and Zang, 2009; Bradley et al., 2019). These intrafirm tournament incentives and 
sentiments can impede knowledge sharing, and even lead to sabotage (Bonner et al., 2000; Chen, 
2003; Brown and Heywood, 2009; Harbring and Irlenbusch, 2011; Charness et al., 2014). In 
addition, analysts might refrain from sharing due to the social comparisons they make with their 
colleagues. Management research shows that employees are more likely to compare themselves 
to those they are more closely located to or with whom they interact more frequently (Festinger, 
1954; Kulik and Ambrose, 1992). Such social comparisons can lead to feelings of envy and 
jealousy that might hinder collaboration among colleagues (Nickerson and Zenger, 2008; Kilduff 
et al., 2010; Tai et al., 2012).  
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Our study allows us to investigate whether collaboration exists in an analyst setting among 
competitors. Previous studies examine information sharing when the information comes from 
research directors, macroeconomists, quantitative analysts, debt analysts, or mentors working for 
the same brokerage house (Hugon et al., 2016; Bradley et al., 2019; Birru et al., 2019; Do and 
Zhang, 2019; Hugon et al., 2019). However, these colleagues either work in a different 
functional area or already have higher status in the brokerage than the analyst, and thus they 
likely do not view her as a competitor for bonuses or promotions. By contrast, we study whether 
analysts share information with peers in the same department, with similar status, and with 
whom they interact frequently given the related nature of the industries they cover. In a recent 
study, Hwang et al. (2019) find that analysts learn from colleagues when their respective covered 
firms are involved in an M&A. Our study is broader in scope, as we examine information sharing 
among colleagues who cover firms in economically connected industries.  
The question of whether analysts share information with colleagues in such a setting is an 
empirical one. If analysts do share information, we predict that such activity should result in an 
improvement in analyst research performance when the level of economic connectedness 
between the analyst and her colleagues is high. This leads to our first hypothesis: 
H1: Analyst performance benefits more from information sharing with colleagues when the 
colleagues cover industries that are more economically connected to the industry covered by the 
analyst.  
In addition to examining whether information sharing benefits analyst research, we examine 
the nature of this effect by exploring potential cross-sectional variations resulting from colleague 
research quality and analyst-colleague social ties. First, we examine whether information sharing 
yields greater benefits when colleagues exhibit higher research quality. The intuition for this is 
simply that analysts are more likely to seek information from higher-quality colleagues, and the 
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information acquired from such colleagues are more useful and timely. Consistent with this 
intuition, Do and Zhang (2019) and Bradley et al. (2019) find the quality of analysts’ mentors 
and research directors is positively related to their beneficial effect on analyst performance. 
However, higher-quality colleagues have higher opportunity costs in sharing their time and lower 
expectations for reciprocal relations, and as such, they might be less willing to share information 
(Hardin, 1982; Cabrera and Cabrera, 2002; Fulk et al., 2004; Levine and Prietula, 2012). We 
develop the following hypothesis to empirically test this conjecture:  
H2a: Analyst performance benefits more from information sharing with colleagues when the 
colleagues covering the economically connected industries exhibit higher research quality.  
We also investigate whether colleagues can share information more effectively when they 
have stronger social ties. A collaborative relationship may take time to develop and preexisting 
social ties may facilitate the development of this relation through an understanding of each 
other’s strengths, information needs, communication styles, and work schedules. A preexisting 
relationship, which can include geographic proximity, can facilitate interaction and encourage 
information sharing, and preexisting social ties may make analysts more willing to help each 
other (Cohen et al., 2010). However, analysts who know each other well may also be more likely 
to compare themselves to each other (Festinger, 1954; Kulik and Ambrose, 1992; Kilduff et al., 
2010), which can lead to feelings of envy and jealousy (Nickerson and Zenger, 2008; Tai et al., 
2012; Charness et al., 2014). We thus have our final hypothesis: 
H2b: Analyst performance benefits more from information sharing with colleagues covering 
economically connected industries when the analyst and her colleagues have stronger 
preexisting social ties.  
3. Empirical measure and research design  
3.1. Empirical measures and descriptive statistics of industry interdependence and 
economic connection 
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To construct our measure of industry economic interdependence, we follow prior studies 
(Fan and Goyal, 2006; Menzly and Ozbas, 2010; Ahern, 2012) and obtain the Benchmark Input-
Output Accounts prepared by the BEA for our sample period of 1982 to 2017. They consist of 
Make and Use tables showing the dollar values of the production and consumption of 
commodities, including goods and services, by each industry in each year, respectively. In 
providing a summary of the supply chains across the economy, these data allow us to measure 
how much an industry’s production relies on inputs from other industries.  
To construct our measure, we begin by specifying that, for every industry pair 𝑖 and 𝑗, the 
importance of 𝑗 to 𝑖 is the ratio of the sum of industry 𝑖’s input commodities made by industry 𝑗 
(i.e., 𝑗’s importance to 𝑖 as its upstream industry) and industry 𝑖’s output commodities used by 
industry 𝑗 (i.e., 𝑗’s importance to 𝑖 as its downstream industry), to industry 𝑖’s total output. That 
is, the importance of one industry to another depends on its role as both a supplier and a 
customer (Acemoglu et al., 2012; Baqaee, 2018).8 Thus, our measure of industry 




𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑘 𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑑 𝑏𝑦 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑖𝑡 × % 𝑜𝑓 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑘 𝑚𝑎𝑑𝑒 𝑏𝑦 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑗𝑡 +
𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑘 𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑑 𝑏𝑦 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑗𝑡 × % 𝑜𝑓 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑘 𝑚𝑎𝑑𝑒 𝑏𝑦 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑖𝑡
)𝑘
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑖𝑡
 
 
where 𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 indicates the importance of industry 𝑗 to industry 𝑖 in year 𝑡. 
To obtain our industry codes, we follow BEA’s industry definitions and classify our firm-year 
observations into the corresponding industries based on the firms’ historical NAICS codes (or 
current NAICS code if historical ones are not available) obtained from COMPUSTAT. The 
                                                        
8 In an additional analysis, we examine industry 𝑗’s importance to industry 𝑖 as a supplier and as a customer 
separately, and find that the analyst’s expense forecast accuracy benefits from colleague coverage of supplier 
industries, and her revenue forecast accuracy benefits from colleague coverage of customer industries. See Section 
5.2 for details. 
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descriptive statistics of 𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 (reported in Panel A of Table 2) show that the mean 
(median) value of 𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 is 1.5% (0.4%). The literature considers any relationship of at 
least 1% or 5% to be sufficiently economically significant to identify vertical mergers (Guckin et 
al., 1991; Matsusaka, 1996; Fan and Goyal, 2006), so we use this range as a benchmark. For our 
sample, we find that around 32% of the industry pairs have an 𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 value greater than 
1%, and around 7% of the industry pairs have an 𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 value greater than 5%. The 
average cross-sectional standard deviation of 𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 for our sample is 4.8%, suggesting a 
wide variation in the economic interdependence across industries in the U.S. economy.  
Our untabulated results show that the economic connection between industries changes 
over time, with an average time-series standard deviation of 0.6% for a given industry pair, 
larger than the median value of 𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 (0.4%). We observe that some industry pairs 
experience large changes. For example, the 𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 of Warehousing and Storage (BEA 
industry code 493) to Primary Metals (BEA industry code 331) increased from 0% in 1982 to 
1.66% in 2017. 
Next, we measure the economic connection between an analyst’s industry and her 
colleagues’ industries as the sum of the 𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 of all of the industries covered by her 
colleagues to her industry.9 We label this variable as 𝐼𝑛𝑑_𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑙,𝑖,𝑡, where analyst 𝑙 covers 
industry 𝑖 in year 𝑡:  
                                                        
9 An alternative approach is to focus on companies with direct trading relationships and measure the importance of 
colleague coverage at the company level. We do not choose this approach for the following reasons. First, one 
company can have many potential customers (suppliers) in a downstream (upstream) industry. Therefore, focusing 
on direct trading relationships likely understates the prevalence of information sharing among analysts. Second, after 
1997, firms voluntarily disclose major customers (customers that contribute to greater than 10% of the company’s 
total revenues) under SFAS No. 131, creating a selection bias in the data. Third, major customers are usually much 
larger than the disclosing companies (Cohen and Frazzini, 2008). As a result, it is difficult to detect information flow 
from suppliers to customers (Menzly and Ozbas, 2010). Nonetheless, in a sensitivity test, we control for the number 
of an analyst’s covered firms that have direct suppliers or customers covered by herself and the number of an 
analyst’s covered firms that have direct suppliers or customers covered by her colleagues, and continue to find 
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𝐼𝑛𝑑_𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑙,𝑖,𝑡 = ∑ 𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑗,𝑡
𝐽𝑙,𝑡
𝑗 , 
where 𝐽𝑙,𝑡 are industries covered by analyst 𝑙’s colleagues in year 𝑡, and industry 𝑗 is one 
of 𝐽𝑙,𝑡.
10 Intuitively, this measure reflects the sum of industry 𝑖’s input commodities made by 
industries covered by analyst 𝑙’s colleagues, and industry 𝑖’s output commodities used by 
industries covered by analyst 𝑙’s colleagues.  
[Insert Table 1 here] 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
As mentioned, our sample consists of data on all of the analysts included in I/B/E/S from 
1982 to 2017 and for whom we have the data needed to measure our required variables. Based on 
this condition, we have yields 72,033 analyst-year observations or 221,328 analyst-industry-year 
observations. The mean value of 𝐼𝑛𝑑_𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑐𝑡 indicates that, on average, an analyst’s colleagues 
cover industries that make and use 69.8% of the total output of the industry she follows, which is 
economically significant. There are substantial variations in industry connection to colleagues: 
the third quartile of 𝐼𝑛𝑑_𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑐𝑡 is 0.952, indicating that the analyst’s colleagues cover 
industries that account for 95.2% of her industry’s outputs, while those in the first quartile cover 
only 38.5%.  
The variation in 𝐼𝑛𝑑_𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑐𝑡 arises from two sources. The first is the number of industries 
covered by the analyst’s colleagues. An analyst with more extensive colleague industry 
                                                        
significant results for 𝐼𝑛𝑑_𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑐𝑡 (tabulated in Internet Appendix Table IA1 Panel A). We also exclude 
colleagues who cover firms with direct suppliers or customers relation with the firms covered by the analyst in 
calculating economic connection (𝐼𝐶_𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑐𝑡_𝑁𝑜𝐷𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡) and find that all our results are similar except one 
measure of research productivity (tabulated in Internet Appendix Table IA1 Panel B). These results are consistent 
with analysts benefiting from information sharing from colleagues who cover economically connected industries 
even though their covered firms do not have a direct relation.  
10 If two colleagues cover the same industry 𝑗, we only count 𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑗 once in calculating 𝐼𝑛𝑑_𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑐𝑡. 
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coverage—either because she has a greater number of colleagues or her colleagues on average 
cover a broader set of industries—likely has a higher 𝐼𝑛𝑑_𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑐𝑡. In our sample, analysts who 
work for larger brokers have a higher 𝐼𝑛𝑑_𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑐𝑡 (a Pearson correlation between employer 
size and 𝐼𝑛𝑑_𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑐𝑡 of 0.56, as seen in Table 2, Panel C). Therefore, we include broker size 
and broker fixed effects in all of our empirical analyses to control for the effect of other types of 
brokerage resources correlated with brokerage size.  
The second source is the variation in the importance of the economic connection between the 
analyst’s industry and those of her colleagues. We find that the average cross-sectional standard 
deviation of 𝐼𝑛𝑑_𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑐𝑡 within each broker-year is 14.0%, that is, 20% of the average level of 
𝐼𝑛𝑑_𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑐𝑡 (69.38%). This finding indicates that analysts who work for the same broker in the 
same year, that is, analysts who have identical colleagues (excluding themselves), have vastly 
different levels of economic connectedness with colleagues, driven by the varying degrees of the 
economic interdependence among industries.  
Thus, the 𝐼𝑛𝑑_𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑐𝑡 for an analyst who works for the same broker changes over time 
because of colleague turnovers, changes in colleague industry coverage, or changes in economic 
connections among industries. Our untabulated analyses show that the average time-series 
standard deviation of 𝐼𝑛𝑑_𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑐𝑡 for each analyst–broker pair is 16.1%.11 
3.2. Empirical measures of analyst performance and research design to test H1 
We focus on two dimensions of analyst research performance: research quality and 
productivity. We measure research quality by earnings forecast accuracy and stock 
recommendation profitability, which are considered analysts’ most important and visible 
                                                        
11 In Section 5.3, we use colleague turnover (i.e., the hiring or departure of a colleague who covers an economically 
important industry) and find the results are consistent with those of our main analyses. That is, analyst performance 
improves (deteriorates) after the hiring (departure) of such a colleague.  
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quantitative outputs. We measure research productivity with the market cap of analyst-covered 
firms and report issuance frequency. Performance is measured at the analyst-industry-year level. 
Research quality: Earnings forecast accuracy and stock recommendation profitability 
We follow previous studies (Hong et al., 2000) and calculate the relative earnings forecast 
accuracy of analyst 𝑙 for company 𝑝 in year 𝑡 as follows:  
𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦𝑙,𝑝,𝑡 = 100 − [
𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘_𝐹𝐸𝑙,𝑝,𝑡−1
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝐴𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑠𝑝,𝑡−1
] × 100, 
where 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝐴𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑠𝑝,𝑡 is the number of analysts issuing earnings forecasts for company 
𝑝 in year 𝑡, and 𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘_𝐹𝐸𝑙,𝑝,𝑡 is the ranking of the absolute forecast error (i.e., the absolute value 
of the difference between the forecasted and actual earnings per share) of her last annual 
earnings forecast for the company issued at least one month prior to the fiscal year end. The 
analyst with the lowest (highest) absolute forecast error receives the first (last) rank and has an 
𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦𝑙,𝑝,𝑡 of 100 (0). Next, to obtain an analyst’s earnings forecast accuracy for a given 
industry-year, we take the average of 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦𝑙,𝑝,𝑡 across all of the companies analyst 𝑙 covers 
in industry 𝑖 in year 𝑡 (𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦𝑙,𝑖,𝑡). This specification measures the analyst’s relative forecast 
accuracy compared to that of her peers who follow the same industry.  
We measure stock recommendation profitability in a similar manner. We calculate the return 
obtained from following analyst 𝑙’s recommendation for company 𝑝 in year 𝑡. Using the market-
adjusted buy-and-hold return, we assume a long position for buy and strong buy 
recommendations, and a short position for hold, sell, and strong sell recommendations.12 We 
specify an investment window starting from two days after the recommendation announcement 
                                                        
12 In a sensitivity test, we exclude all hold recommendations in calculating stock recommendation profitability and 
find similar results as our main analyses. 
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date and ending on either 364 days after the recommendation announcement date or 2 days 
before the next recommendation announcement date, whichever is earlier. Next, we rank all of 
the analysts following company 𝑝 in year 𝑡 and normalize their rankings from 0 to 100, with the 
most profitable analyst receiving a 𝑅𝑒𝑐_𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑙,𝑝,𝑡 of 100. Finally, we use the average 
𝑅𝑒𝑐_𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑙,𝑝,𝑡 across all of the companies that analyst 𝑙 covers in industry 𝑖 in year 𝑡 to obtain 
her relative stock recommendation profitability for the industry-year (𝑅𝑒𝑐_𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑙,𝑖,𝑡). 
Research productivity: Covered firms’ market cap and report issuance frequency 
We suggest that in addition to the benefits for research quality, research productivity may 
also increase due to analysts’ information sharing. Specifically, when an analyst is able to obtain 
value-relevant information from her colleagues, she can use such information directly in her 
research and can also allocate more time and effort to acquiring information in her own industry, 
both of which increase her research output. 
To measure research productivity, we use the total market cap covered in an industry and the 
number of reports issued for firms in that industry. The research suggests covering larger firms 
allows an analyst to gain visibility and generate more trading commissions for her brokerage 
house (Hong and Kubik, 2003). Groysberg et al. (2011) find a positive relation between covered 
companies’ market cap and an analyst’s compensation. As for our measures of research quality, 
we use the normalized ranking of market cap covered in the industry (𝐼𝑛𝑑_𝑀𝑉𝑙,𝑖,𝑡) to control for 
differences in task difficulty and company size across industries.  
Our second measure of research productivity is the frequency of analyst reports issued for 
firms in a given industry (𝐼𝑛𝑑_𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑙,𝑖,𝑡). We use a normalized ranking similar to that of 
𝐼𝑛𝑑_𝑀𝑉𝑙,𝑖,𝑡. Following Frankel et al. (2006), we use earnings forecast revisions on I/B/E/S to 
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identify issuance of reports. The number of reports is widely used by brokerage houses as an 
action-based performance measure to evaluate analysts (Groysberg et al., 2011). Prior research 
suggests that more frequent report issuance generates more trading commissions and investment 
banking fees for brokerages (Krigman et al., 2001; Juergens and Lindsey, 2009). Thus, analysts 
have incentives to issue frequent reports. 
Research design to test H1 
To test HI, we use the following pooled OLS regression model:  
𝐴𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 = 𝛼 + 𝛽 ∙ 𝐼𝑛𝑑_𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑐𝑡 +
∑ 𝛾𝑚𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙_𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑚𝑚 + 𝐵𝑟𝑜𝑘𝑒𝑟 𝐹𝐸 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦_𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝐸 + 𝜀, 
(1) 
 
where 𝐴𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 consists of 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦, 𝑅𝑒𝑐_𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡, 𝐼𝑛𝑑_𝑀𝑉, and 𝐼𝑛𝑑_𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑞. 
Our main variable of interest is 𝐼𝑛𝑑_𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑐𝑡. From H1, we expect that the coefficient for 
𝐼𝑛𝑑_𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑐𝑡 will be positive. That is, information sharing among colleagues creates greater 
performance benefits when these colleagues cover industries that are more economically 
connected to the analyst’s industry.  
As discussed in Section 3.1, it is essential that we control for other types of brokerage 
resources because analysts working for larger brokers tend to have a higher 𝐼𝑛𝑑_𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑐𝑡. 
Larger brokerage houses generally have higher reputations, and are more likely to support 
analyst research through training programs, distribution networks, and easier access to firm 
management, databases, research, and administrative assistance. These brokerage houses also 
tend to have better research directors, macroeconomists, and quant analysts. Such resources can 
attract higher-quality analysts, leading to a positive correlation between analyst performance 
and 𝐼𝑛𝑑_𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑐𝑡. To address this endogeneity concern, we include broker size (measured as the 
total number of analysts working for the broker) and broker fixed effects in our estimation 
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(Stickel, 1995; Clement, 1999; Jacob et al., 1999).13, 14 Thus, we can compare variations among 
analysts within a broker—that is, whether analysts who cover industries that are more 
economically connected with those of colleagues perform better than other analysts in the same 
broker.15 
In addition to controlling for brokerage characteristics, we follow the literature (e.g., Mikhail 
et al., 1997; Clement, 1999; Jacob et al., 1999; Hong and Kubik, 2003; Clement and Tse, 2005) 
and control for a number of analyst characteristics that might be correlated with performance, 
such as industry experience (𝐼𝑛𝑑_𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑟), the number of industries followed (𝑁𝐼𝑛𝑑), the number 
of companies followed in the industry (𝑁𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚), the average number of reports issued per 
covered company in the industry (𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑞), and the average forecast horizon (𝐻𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑧𝑜𝑛). Finally, 
we control for the following firm characteristics that reflect an analyst’s coverage selection and 
can affect her performance: firm size (𝑀𝑉, the average log market cap of companies followed by 
the analyst in the industry-year), market-to-book ratio (𝑀𝑇𝐵, the average market-to-book ratio of 
firms followed by the analyst in the industry-year), and firm profitability (𝑅𝑂𝐴, the average 
return on assets of firms followed by the analyst in the industry-year). We also include industry-
year fixed effects to control for industry-wide and time-series variations. The definitions of the 
variables are provided in the Appendix. We winsorize all continuous variables that are not based 
on normalized ranks at the top and bottom 1%. The standard errors are estimated with two-way 
clustering at the analyst and industry-year levels (Petersen, 2009). 
                                                        
13 In a sensitivity analysis, we control for analyst quality by replacing brokerage fixed effects with analyst fixed 
effects in our regressions and find similar results (tabulated in Internet Appendix Table IA2). 
14 Our empirical results remain the same if we use an alternative measure of broker size that is based on the number 
of industries covered by the broker.  
15 In a sensitivity analysis, we exclude broker fixed effects from our regressions, and find that 𝐼𝑛𝑑_𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑐𝑡 is 
significantly positive and the economic magnitude of the effect of information sharing is larger (tabulated in Internet 
Appendix Table IA3). 
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4. Empirical results  
4.1. Descriptive statistics  
From the descriptive statistics reported in Panel B of Table 2, we see that the median analyst 
in our sample covers two industries and five companies, issues 13 reports a year, and has 48 
colleagues.16 In Panel C, we further see that 𝐼𝑛𝑑_𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑐𝑡 is positively correlated with all of the 
analyst performance measures (significant at the 0.01 level), consistent with our prediction that 
information sharing benefits analyst research.  
4.2. Relation between analyst performance and the economic importance of colleagues’ 
covered industries  
Table 3 reports the empirical results for our analysis of the relation between the analyst’s 
performance and the economic connectedness of the industries covered by her colleagues (i.e., 
H1). Column 1 presents the results for analyst forecast accuracy (𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦). In Column 1, we 
see that the coefficient for 𝐼𝑛𝑑_𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑐𝑡 is positive and significant (at the 0.01 level), supporting 
our prediction that information sharing from colleagues covering related industries improves 
analyst earning forecast accuracy. The results further show that forecast accuracy is positively 
correlated with both industry experience (𝐼𝑛𝑑_𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑟) and the number of industries followed 
(𝑁𝐼𝑛𝑑), which is consistent with previous findings (e.g., Clement, 1999; Jacob et al., 1999). 
Furthermore, forecast accuracy is positively correlated with the number of companies covered in 
the industry (𝑁𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚) and the number of forecasts issued per company in the industry (𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑞), as 
these measures capture the analyst’s effort and her breadth of knowledge, but as expected is 
negatively correlated with forecast horizon (𝐻𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑧𝑜𝑛). Finally, we find that forecast accuracy is 
                                                        
16 The low average numbers of firms covered and reports issued are driven by the sample analysts in the earlier 
years. In 2008–2017, the median analyst covers 9 firms and issues 33 reports per year. 
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negatively correlated with broker size (𝐵𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒) when broker fixed effects are included in the 
regression, but the correlation is either insignificant (Internet Appendix Table IA2 and IA3) or 
significantly positive (Internet Appendix Table IA4) when broker fixed effects are not included.  
[Insert Table 3 here] 
Table 3, Column 2 reports the results for stock recommendation profitability (𝑅𝑒𝑐_𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡). 
Again, we find the coefficient on 𝐼𝑛𝑑_𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑐𝑡 to be positive and significant (at the 0.10 level), 
suggesting that information sharing from colleagues covering economically connected industries 
enables the analyst to provide more profitable recommendations. Similar to our results for 
forecast accuracy, we find positive significant correlations for 𝑁𝐼𝑛𝑑, 𝑁𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚, and 𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑞.  
Columns 3 and 4 report the results for our two analyst research productivity measures. We 
find positive correlations (significant at the 0.10 level) for both measures of productivity—that 
is, the market cap covered in the industry (𝐼𝑛𝑑_𝑀𝑉) and the report issuance frequency for the 
industry (𝐼𝑛𝑑_𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑞)—after we control for brokerage size, experience, and portfolio complexity. 
These results suggest that information sharing about economically connected industries allows 
an analyst to focus more on her own industry.  
4.3. Cross-sectional tests on the relation between analyst performance and the economic 
connectedness of colleague industries 
In this section, we examine the cross-sectional variations in the effect of information sharing 
on analyst performance as predicted in H2.  
To test H2a, wherein analyst research benefits more from information sharing when the 
connected colleagues are of higher quality, we measure colleague research quality using their 
forecast accuracy, recommendation profitability, industry experience, and II star status. We 
separately calculate the sum of the 𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 of the industries covered by colleagues whose 
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research quality is above and below the sample median (or who are star and non-star rated) and 
label them 𝐼𝐶_𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ_𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 and 𝐼𝐶_𝐿𝑜𝑤_𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦, respectively. To examine whether our 
information sharing effect varies with colleague quality, we replace 𝐼𝑛𝑑_𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑐𝑡 in Eq. (1) with 
𝐼𝐶_𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ_𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 and 𝐼𝐶_𝐿𝑜𝑤_𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 and predict that information sharing from high-quality 
colleagues has a larger impact than that from low-quality colleagues. That is, the estimated 
coefficient on 𝐼𝐶_𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ_𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 should be significantly larger than that on 𝐼𝐶_𝐿𝑜𝑤_𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦. 
 [Insert Table 4 here] 
Table 4 reports the results. Panel A presents our comparison of the effects of information 
sharing from more accurate colleagues (𝐼𝐶_𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ_𝐴𝑐𝑐) with those from less accurate colleagues 
(𝐼𝐶_𝐿𝑜𝑤_𝐴𝑐𝑐) on the analyst’s research quality (𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦 and 𝑅𝑒𝑐_𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡) and productivity 
(𝐼𝑛𝑑_𝑀𝑉 and 𝐼𝑛𝑑_𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑞). The results show that the coefficients on 𝐼𝐶_𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ_𝐴𝑐𝑐 are 
significantly greater than those on 𝐼𝐶_𝐿𝑜𝑤_𝐴𝑐𝑐 for both forecast accuracy and report frequency 
(at the 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively). Panel B presents our comparison of the effects of 
information sharing from more profitable colleagues (𝐼𝐶_𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ_𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡) with those from less 
profitable colleagues (𝐼𝐶_𝐿𝑜𝑤_𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡). We see that the coefficients on 𝐼𝐶_𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ_𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡 are 
significantly greater than those on 𝐼𝐶_𝐿𝑜𝑤_𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡 for both recommendation profitability and 
forecast frequency (at the 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively). That is, intuitively, information 
sharing from colleagues with more accurate earnings forecast improves earnings forecast 
accuracy, and information sharing from more profitable recommendation colleagues improves 
recommendation profitability, consistent with evidence that the two types of forecasts involve 
information of different natures (Bradshaw, 2004; Ertimur et al., 2007). Continuing with Table 4, 
from Panel C, we shows that the coefficients on 𝐼𝐶_𝐿𝑜𝑛𝑔_𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑟 (more experienced colleagues) 
are significantly greater than those on 𝐼𝐶_𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡_𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑟 (less experienced colleagues) for forecast 
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accuracy, market cap covered, and report frequency (all at the 0.01 level). Finally, Panel D 
shows that although information sharing improves analyst forecast accuracy regardless of star 
status, only information sharing with star colleagues improves recommendation profitability. 
However, there is no significant difference between the effects of star and non-star colleagues, 
which is possibly because information sharing from star colleagues provides benefits beyond 
quantitative research outputs (Do and Zhang, 2019). Together, the results in Table 4, Panels A-C 
show that the proxies for 𝐼𝐶_𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ_𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 are statistically significant in eight out of 12 
specifications, whereas the proxies for 𝐼𝐶_𝐿𝑜𝑤_𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 are statistically significant in only three 
out of 12 specifications. The differences between the proxies are statistically significant at the 
5% level in seven out of 12 specifications. Thus, we conclude that there is evidence supporting 
H2a that an analyst benefits more from information sharing with higher-quality colleagues, 
especially when analyst quality is defined by objective measures such as earnings forecast 
accuracy, stock recommendation profitability, and industry experience. 
We next turn to H2b and examine whether the effect of information sharing is more salient 
when the analyst and her colleagues have stronger professional, social, or educational ties. To 
measure the relationship between the analyst and her colleagues, we use the length of their 
working relationship, their work location proximity, and whether they studied in the same 
school. To obtain information about the analysts’ historical work locations and educational 
backgrounds, we use their LinkedIn profiles. Hence, some tests of H2b are based on the 
subsample of analysts who have LinkedIn profiles and covers a shorter sample period (2007–
2016). Empirically, we classify a colleague as having a stronger tie with the analyst if the length 
of their relationship (measured by the number of years they have worked together in the current 
broker) is above the median, if they work in the same city, or if they studied at the same 
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university. For each analyst, we separately calculate the level of economic connection between 
the industries covered by these two groups of colleagues and the analyst’s industry, and denote 
them as 𝐼𝐶_𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑔_𝑇𝑖𝑒𝑠 and 𝐼𝐶_𝑊𝑒𝑎𝑘_𝑇𝑖𝑒𝑠, respectively. In our analyses, we replace 
𝐼𝑛𝑑_𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑐𝑡 in Eq. (1) with 𝐼𝐶_𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑔_𝑇𝑖𝑒𝑠 and 𝐼𝐶_𝑊𝑒𝑎𝑘_𝑇𝑖𝑒𝑠 and rerun our analyses. 
Recall that H2b predicts that information sharing from strongly tied colleagues should have a 
larger impact than that from weakly tied colleagues. That is, the estimated coefficients 
on 𝐼𝐶_𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑔_𝑇𝑖𝑒𝑠 should be larger than those on 𝐼𝐶_𝑊𝑒𝑎𝑘_𝑇𝑖𝑒𝑠 .  
[Insert Table 5 here] 
From Table 5, Panel A, we see that 𝐼𝐶_𝐿𝑜𝑛𝑔_𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 has a significantly positive 
correlation with all four of the performance measures, whereas the coefficient on 
𝐼𝐶_𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡_𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 is positive and significant only in the regression of forecast accuracy. 
However, the magnitudes of the two sets of coefficients are significantly different only in the 
regression of report frequency (at the 0.01 level). Panel B shows that the coefficients on 
𝐼𝐶_𝑆𝑎𝑚𝑒_𝐶𝑖𝑡𝑦 are significantly greater than those on 𝐼𝐶_𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓_𝐶𝑖𝑡𝑦 in the regressions of 
forecast accuracy, total market cap covered, and report frequency (at least at the 0.05 level). 
Finally, Panel C shows that the coefficients on 𝐼𝐶_𝑆𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙_𝑇𝑖𝑒𝑠 are significantly greater than 
those on 𝐼𝐶_𝑁𝑜_𝑆𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙_𝑇𝑖𝑒𝑠 in the regressions of recommendation profitability and report 
frequency (at the 0.01 level). Overall, we find that our relationship proxies for strong social ties 
(𝐼𝐶_𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑔_𝑇𝑖𝑒𝑠) are statistically significant in all 12 specifications, whereas the proxies for 
𝐼𝐶_𝑊𝑒𝑎𝑘_𝑇𝑖𝑒𝑠 are statistically significant in only two out of 12 specifications. The differences 
between the proxies are statistically significant at the 5% level in six out of 12 specifications, 
with all three differences significant at the 1% level when the dependent variable is report 
frequency. We conclude that the evidence supports H2b that analyst research, especially report 
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issuance frequency, benefits more from information sharing from colleagues with whom the 
analyst has stronger professional, social, or educational ties. 
4.4. Investor recognition of benefits of analyst information sharing across economically 
connected industries  
In this section, we examine whether investors recognize the benefits of analyst information 
sharing among colleagues covering economically connected industries. Investors’ recognition 
reflects their overall assessment of analyst research quality, which can go beyond the analyst 
quantitative research outputs we examine, that is, earnings forecast accuracy and stock 
recommendation profitability.  
To measure investor recognition of analyst performance, we follow prior literature and 
use the market reaction to analyst reports (e.g., Francis and Soffer, 1997; Loh and Stulz, 2011; 
Bradley et al., 2014). In particular, we measure the market reaction to an analyst report for 
company 𝑝 in year 𝑡 as the cumulative absolute three-day market-adjusted return centered on the 
earnings forecast revision date. We take the average market reaction of all of the reports issued 
by each analyst l for firms in industry 𝑖 in year 𝑡 (𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡_𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑙,𝑖,𝑡) to obtain our first measure of 
investor recognition of analyst performance. 
For our second measure of investor recognition of analyst performance, we use the annual 
All-Star Ranking list published by Institutional Investor (hereafter, II All-Star Ranking).17 We 
identify an analyst as a star (𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑙,𝑡) if she is ranked among the first, second, or third teams or if 
she is listed as a runner-up by II in year 𝑡.18 To determine analyst rankings, II surveys a set of 
                                                        
17 II polls a large number of institutional investors (e.g., the directors of research and the chief investment officers of 
major money management institutions) and determines its rankings using the number of votes awarded to each 
analyst weighted by the size of the institution responding.  
18 As II ranks the analysts according to their main industry, we assign each analyst-year to the industry in which she 
covers the largest market cap, based on the assumption that she has the most influence in that industry. We also 
measure the independent variables, including 𝐼𝑛𝑑_𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑐𝑡, at the analyst-year level using that industry. 
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institutional investors and asks them to vote for an analyst based on a comprehensive set of 
attributes, including industry knowledge, integrity, accessibility, management access, special 
services, written reports, financial models, useful and timely calls and visits, idea generation, 
research delivery, earnings estimates, and stock selection. Among these attributes, industry 
knowledge has been ranked as the most desirable quality in 13 out of the 14 years during which 
II has surveyed institutional investors (1998–2011). This is important for our study as we 
examine the role of information sharing from colleagues covering economically connected 
industries. Such sharing may be particularly beneficial to an analyst’s industry knowledge as it 
alerts her to pertinent developments, such as trends in input prices, supply and demand shocks, 
and technological advancements, in these related industries. Obtaining this information from 
colleagues saves the analyst time and effort that she can spend on researching her own industry. 
Finally, the sharing of information among colleagues who cover related industries helps analysts 
produce research reports that “connect the dots” across industries and provide “big picture” 
investment ideas valued by institutional investors.  
In this set of analyses, we predict that the market understands the benefits of information 
sharing and award more investor recognition to analysts who have colleagues covering 
economically connected industries. That is, investors react more strongly to the reports of these 
analysts, who are in turn more likely to be ranked as II All-Star analysts. We use the following 
model in OLS and Probit specifications:  
𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑔𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
= 𝛼 + 𝛽 ∙ 𝐼𝑛𝑑_𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑐𝑡 + ∑ 𝛾𝑚𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙_𝐼𝑅𝑚
𝑚
+ 𝐵𝑟𝑜𝑘𝑒𝑟 𝐹𝐸
+ 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦_𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝐸 + 𝜀, 
(2) 
 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3502820




where 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑔𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 is either 𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡_𝐶𝐴𝑅 or 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑟. In this set of regressions, we 
control for broker, analyst, and firm characteristics that have been shown to affect investor 
recognition. These characteristics are broker size (𝐵𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒), industry experience (𝐼𝑛𝑑_𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑟), the 
number of industries covered (𝑁𝐼𝑛𝑑), the number of firms covered in the industry (𝑁𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚), 
report frequency (𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑞), earnings forecast horizon (𝐻𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑧𝑜𝑛), and market cap (𝑀𝑉), market-to-
book ratio (𝑀𝑇𝐵), and profitability (𝑅𝑂𝐴) of the covered firms. For the regression with 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑟 as 
the dependent variable, we include control variables for earnings forecast accuracy (𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦), 
optimism (𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑚), and boldness (𝐵𝑜𝑙𝑑). To the extent that information sharing improves 
analyst forecast performance in areas such as forecast accuracy and report frequency, the 
coefficient on 𝐼𝑛𝑑_𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑐𝑡 in Eq. (2) should reflect the impact of information sharing beyond 
its effect on forecast accuracy and report frequency. In other words, the total impact of 
information sharing on an analyst’s star status is likely larger than what is reflected by the 
marginal effect of 𝐼𝑛𝑑_𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑐𝑡 in this model.  
We examine the market’s response around an analyst’s report issuance date (𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡_𝐶𝐴𝑅, 
measured with earnings forecast revision date from I/B/E/S). The results in Table 6, Column 1 
show that the coefficient on 𝐼𝑛𝑑_𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑐𝑡 is positive and significant (at the 0.01 level), 
supporting our prediction that information sharing from colleagues covering related industries 
improves the analyst’s market impact. These results are economically significant, with a one 
standard deviation increase in 𝐼𝑛𝑑_𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑐𝑡 associated with an 11 basis-point increase in market 
response. We find the following controls to be positively correlated with market response: broker 
size (𝐵𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒), the number of companies covered in the industry (𝑁𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚), the number of forecasts 
issued per company in the industry (𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑞), and forecast horizon (𝐻𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑧𝑜𝑛).  
[Insert Table 6 here] 
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In terms of whether analysts with colleagues covering economically connected industries are 
more likely to receive star status (𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑟), we see from the results in Column 2 that the coefficient 
on 𝐼𝑛𝑑_𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑐𝑡 is positive and significant (at the 0.01 level). This finding suggests that 
information sharing from colleagues improves the qualitative aspects of analyst performance—
such as industry knowledge, written reports, and idea generation—that institutional investors 
value. This result is also economically significant: a one standard deviation increase in 
𝐼𝑛𝑑_𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑐𝑡 (0.381) increases the odds of being ranked as a star by 11.8% (1.7% compared to 
the unconditional probability of 14.4%). Finally, for star status, we find positive correlations 
with 𝐵𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒, 𝐼𝑛𝑑_𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑟, 𝑁𝐼𝑛𝑑, 𝑁𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚, 𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑞, and 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦, and a negative correlation with 
𝐻𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑧𝑜𝑛, suggesting that the total impact of information sharing on star status, which includes 
its effects through forecast accuracy and report frequency, is even larger.19  
5. Additional analyses 
5.1. Is an analyst more likely to issue a report when her highly connected colleague 
issues a report?  
Our main result is that information sharing among connected colleagues is beneficial to 
analyst research performance. Although we cannot observe the private communication among 
colleagues, in this section, we provide a more direct test of one likely outcome of information 
sharing activity. When a colleague produces information about her industry and passes the 
relevant information to the analyst who covers a highly connected industry, the analyst is 
prompted to issue reports for companies in her own industry. Thus, we predict that an analyst is 
                                                        
19 Results from untabulated analyses of cross-sectional variations in investor recognition of the benefits of 
information sharing show that investors recognize that an analyst benefits more from information sharing when her 
related industries are covered by higher-quality colleagues, and when the length of the relationship between the 
analyst and her colleagues is longer. 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3502820




more likely to issue a report when her highly connected colleague issues a report, compared to a 
matched analyst who does not have a highly connected colleague.  
To test this prediction, we identify pairs of analysts covering the same company, wherein one 
analyst, who we refer to as the connected analyst (𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 equals 1), has a colleague 
covering a highly connected industry, and the other analyst, referred to as the non-connected 
analyst (𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 equals 0), does not have such colleagues. Here, we define a highly 
connected industry as one with a level of 𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 to the analyst’s covered industry greater 
than or equal to the sample median (0.4%).20 We test whether the connected analyst has a greater 
likelihood of issuing a report for the firm than a non-connected analyst around the report date of 
the connected analyst’s colleague. To ensure that the connected and non-connected analysts are 
comparable in other dimensions, we require the differences in their brokerage firms’ size and 
industry forecasting experience to be less than the corresponding medians (four analysts and two 
years, respectively).21 When there are more than one non-connected analysts matched to a 
connected analyst, we select the one, in the sequence of, having the closest brokerage size, 
industry experience, and total market value of covered firms to the connected analyst. We use 
earnings forecast revisions in I/B/E/S as the analyst report issuance dates. We exclude reports 
issued within one day of any brokerage-hosted conference that the covered firm attends 
(conference dates are obtained from the Compustat Capital IQ Key Development database) to 
eliminate the possibility that the connected analyst and her colleague issue reports 
                                                        
20 If an analyst has more than one such colleagues, we select the one who covers the industry with the highest level 
of 𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 to her industry. In the final sample, the mean (median) of 𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 between the connected 
analysts are 12.3% (7.1%). 
21 We assign each analyst-year to the industry in which she covers the largest market cap. 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3502820




simultaneously because they both attend a conference.22 We estimate the following OLS 
regression:  
𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡_𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒
= 𝛼 + 𝛽 ∙ 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 + ∑ 𝛾𝑚𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙_𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑚
𝑚
+ 𝐵𝑟𝑜𝑘𝑒𝑟 𝐹𝐸
+ 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦_𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝐸 + 𝜀, 
(3) 
 
where 𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡_𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 equals one if the connected or non-connected analyst issues a report in 
the [-1, 1] window of the date that the connected analyst’s colleague issues a report for her 
largest covered firm, and zero otherwise.23 We include brokerage size (𝐵𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒), industry 
experience (𝐼𝑛𝑑_𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑟), the number of industries and firms covered (𝑁𝐼𝑛𝑑 and 𝑁𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚), forecast 
frequency for the firm during the year (𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚_𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑞), and the horizon of the colleague’s report 
(𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚_𝐻𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑧𝑜𝑛) to control for other characteristics that influence the likelihood of report 
issuance.  
Table 7 shows a significantly positive coefficient on 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 (at the level of 0.01). This 
result suggests that around the time an important colleague issues a report, connected analysts 
have a greater chance of issuing a report than non-connected analysts, consistent with the 
conjecture that the colleague shares information with the connected analyst. This effect is 
economically significant, with connected analysts being 25% more likely to issue reports during 
the event window than non-connected analysts (6.41% increase relative to the unconditional 
likelihood of 25.66%). The estimated coefficients for brokerage size, industry experience, and 
                                                        
22 It is unlikely that public informational events affect this analysis because both connected and non-connected 
analysts have access to such events. 
23 We estimate the model with a Probit regression and find similar results that when colleagues issue reports, 
connected analysts are more likely to issue reports than non-connected analysts. Our results remain when we replace 
broker fixed effects with analyst or broker-year fixed effects, or use [-3, +3] and [-5, +5] windows instead of the [-1, 
+1] window. 
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the number of firms covered are insignificant, which indicates the success of our matching 
procedure. Our prediction also holds after conducting falsification tests, in which we change the 
event window to 45 days before or after the colleague’s report date. We find insignificant 
coefficients on 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 (reported in Columns 2 and 3 of Table 7, respectively).24 We can 
conclude that connected and non-connected analysts differ in their tendency to issue a report 
only around the report issuance by the connected analyst’s colleague, not otherwise. Thus, Table 
7 provides more direct evidence of information sharing and supplements our main findings.  
[Insert Table 7 here] 
5.2. Information sharing with colleagues covering upstream and downstream industries 
In this section, we seek further evidence to support H1 by examining information sharing 
with colleagues covering upstream and downstream industries. We expect that upstream 
information sharing has a more pronounced benefit on expense forecasts, as upstream industries 
are an industry’s suppliers. We also expect that downstream information sharing benefits 
revenue forecasts more, as downstream industries are the customers. In this set of tests, we 
measure the importance of upstream industries covered by an analyst’s colleagues 
(𝐼𝐶_𝑈𝑝𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑚) as her industry’s total input commodities made by her colleagues’ industries, 
scaled by the total output of her industry, and the importance of downstream industries covered 
by an analyst’s colleagues (𝐼𝐶_𝐷𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑚) as the proportion of output commodities made by 
the analyst’s industry that are used by her colleagues’ industries (see Appendix for detailed 
variable definitions). Note that the sum of 𝐼𝐶_𝑈𝑝𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑚 and 𝐼𝐶_𝐷𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑚 of an analyst-
industry-year is its 𝐼𝑛𝑑_𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑐𝑡. 
                                                        
24 Using 30 days before or after the colleague’s report date in the falsification tests yield similar insignificant results.  
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We obtain our analyst revenue forecast data from I/B/E/S. For the analyst expense forecast 
measure, we use the difference between her revenue and EBITDA forecasts, as analysts usually 
do not forecast expenses directly. We measure analyst revenue and expense forecast accuracy at 
the industry level (𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦_𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑙,𝑖,𝑡 and 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦_𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑙,𝑖,𝑡) in a similar fashion as earnings 
forecast accuracy (𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦𝑙,𝑖,𝑡), and estimate a regression model similar to Eq. (1). Given that 
we infer an analyst’s expense forecast from her revenue forecasts, we control for her revenue 
forecast accuracy in our regression of expense forecast accuracy. Due to I/B/E/S data 
availability, our sample period for the revenue (expense) forecast accuracy analysis is 1996–
2017 (2002–2017).  
From Table 8, Column 1, we find that the coefficient on 𝐼𝐶_𝐷𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑚 is positive and 
significant (at the 0.05 level) when the dependent variable is 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦_𝑅𝑒𝑣, consistent with the 
notion that downstream information sharing facilitates revenue forecasting. From Column 2, we 
see that the coefficient on 𝐼𝐶_𝑈𝑝𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑚 is positive and significant (at the 0.01 level) when the 
dependent variable is 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦_𝐸𝑥𝑝, suggesting that upstream information facilitates expense 
forecasting. Importantly, we observe that information sharing from upstream (downstream) 
colleagues does not benefit revenue (expense) forecasting. As both colleagues covering upstream 
and downstream industries work for the same brokerage house in the same year, their different 
impacts to the analyst’s expense and revenue forecast accuracy cannot be explained by other 
broker resources. Together, these results alleviate the endogeneity concern and provide support 
for H1. 
[Insert Table 8 here] 
5.3. Colleague turnover analysis 
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To further reinforce our findings and mitigate endogeneity concerns, we examine the effect 
of colleague turnover on our results. For each analyst-industry-year, we first identify whether the 
analyst has highly connected colleagues (as defined in Section 5.1, colleagues who cover an 
industry with a level of 𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 greater than or equal to the sample median of 0.4%) that 
experience a turnover (joining or leaving the broker) during the year. For each affected analyst, 
we compare her performance and investor recognition in the year when the highly connected 
colleague is hired (𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡_𝐻𝑖𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔) or in the year after the highly-connected colleague’s departure 
(𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡_𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒) to her performance and investor recognition of the prior year. We estimate a 
regression similar to Eq. (1) in which we replace 𝐼𝑛𝑑_𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑐𝑡 with the year indicator variable 
of 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡_𝐻𝑖𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔 or 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡_𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒. Here, we expect analyst performance and investor 
recognition to be higher (lower) in the 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡_𝐻𝑖𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔 (𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡_𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒) period due to an 
increase (decrease) in the sharing of information about economically important industries. 
From Table 9, Panel A, we find that the coefficient on 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡_𝐻𝑖𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔 is positive and 
significant (at least at the 0.10 level) in the regressions of research performance, research 
productivity, and market reaction to analyst reports, suggesting that analyst research benefits 
from an increase in colleagues covering economically important industries. From Panel B, we 
find that the coefficient on 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡_𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒 is negative and significant (at the 0.01 level) in the 
regressions of research quality and report frequency, suggesting that analyst research 
performance declines with a decrease in colleagues covering economically important industries. 
We find insignificant results for investor recognition. The results show that 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡_𝐻𝑖𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔 and 
𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡_𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒 are statistically significant in seven out of eight regressions of analyst 
performance and in one out of four regressions of investor recognition. These results suggest that 
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the turnover of important colleagues has an immediate effect on analyst performance, but the 
effect on investor recognition is less clear. 
[Insert Table 9 here] 
5.4. Within broker-year analysis 
In our final subsection, we provide further support for our findings by conducting a within-
broker-year analysis using a matched sample. Specifically, we match an analyst with above-
median 𝐼𝑛𝑑_𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑐𝑡 with an analyst with below-median 𝐼𝑛𝑑_𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑐𝑡 from the same broker in 
the same year. While we previously use broker fixed effects to control for average broker 
characteristics, in this analysis we control for time-varying broker resources. We ensure that the 
matched analysts have the closest quintile-ranking of 𝐼𝑛𝑑_𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑟 and 𝑁𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 so that they have 
similar industry experience and workload. The results in Table 10 show that the coefficient on 
𝐼𝑛𝑑_𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑐𝑡 is positive and significant (at least at the 0.10 level) in all of the regressions of 
analyst performance and investor recognition, suggesting that our results are robust to the 
controls for time-varying broker resources.  
[Insert Table 10 here] 
6. Conclusion 
Anecdotally, the practice of sharing information on economically connected industries is 
readily observable and often encouraged in brokerage houses. Information sharing has numerous 
potential output benefits. For example, the study by Menzly and Ozbas (2010) shows that stocks 
in economically connected industries have correlated fundamentals and can cross-predict each 
other’s returns. The literature, however, typically focuses on analysts as industry specialists, 
implying that they develop their research outputs in a non-collaborative environment. Thus, the 
cross-industry information sharing that occurs among peers is overlooked. Our study addresses 
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this gap by providing evidence consistent with analysts sharing information with colleagues who 
cover economically connected industries.  
We measure the economic interdependence between an analyst’s industry and her 
colleagues’ industries using BEA industry input and output data to assess whether information 
sharing across economically connected industries improves analyst performance. Our results 
suggest that information sharing benefits analysts’ research along multiple dimensions. First, 
after controlling for broker size and broker fixed effects, we find that an analyst exhibits better 
research performance and productivity and has more investor recognition when the economic 
connection between her industry and those of her colleagues is stronger, suggesting that sharing 
information with colleagues benefits her forecast performance. This result remains when we 
replace broker fixed effects with analyst fixed effects, use a change specification, use a matched 
sample, and exploit colleague turnover to mitigate endogeneity concerns. The finding that 
colleagues’ downstream (upstream) coverage only improves an analyst’s revenue (expense) 
forecasts confirms that the benefits come from economic connections with colleagues, not 
merely general brokerage resources. We also investigate the timing of analyst report issuance 
and find that an analyst tends to issue report immediately surrounding the date that her highly-
connected colleagues do so, which provides more direct evidence of information sharing. Our 
study further explores cross-sectional variations in the observed effect and shows evidence that 
stronger colleague research quality and social ties both increase the magnitude of the effect. We 
also find that investors recognize the benefit of information sharing to analysts’ overall research 
quality, as investors react more strongly to reports issued by analysts with higher levels of 
information sharing and more likely rank these analysts as II All-Stars.  
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Our study contributes to the literature by identifying a new channel through which analysts 
collect information and by providing new insights into their information acquisition efforts. The 
evidence of cross-industry information sharing broadens our understanding of the role of analysts 
as industry specialists and reveals how they can facilitate information flow across industries. Our 
results imply that industry specialization does not put analysts at a disadvantage as they are able 
to obtain relevant upstream and downstream information from their colleagues. Our study 
provides practical implications for brokerage houses, as our results suggest that promoting cross-
industry collaboration among colleagues improves analyst research and enhances analysts’ 
reputation among investors. Our findings can also help investors identify analysts who have 
better cross-industry knowledge and can deliver superior research quality.  
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Appendix: Variable Definitions 
Analyst-industry-year level variables: 
Ind_Connectl,i,t The sum of the importance to industry i of all industries covered by other analysts who work 
in the same brokerage as analyst l in year t. The importance of industry j to industry i in year 
t is the ratio of the sum of industry i’s input commodities made by industry j and industry i’s 




𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑘 𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑑 𝑏𝑦 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑖×% 𝑜𝑓 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑘 𝑚𝑎𝑑𝑒 𝑏𝑦 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑗+
𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑘 𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑑 𝑏𝑦 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑗×% 𝑜𝑓 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑘 𝑚𝑎𝑑𝑒 𝑏𝑦 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑖
)𝑘
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑖
  
Accuracyl,i,t The average relative earnings forecast accuracy of analyst l in industry i in year t, following 
Hong et al. (2000). First, absolute earnings forecast error is calculated as the absolute value 
of the difference between the analyst’s last forecasted earnings per share issued at least one 
month prior to the fiscal year end and the actual earnings per share; next, the absolute 
forecast errors of all analysts following the same company are ranked such that the most 
accurate analyst receives a rank of 100 and the least accurate analyst receives a rank of zero; 
last, for analyst l, we take the average of her ranks across all of the companies she covers in 
industry i during year t. 
Rec_Profitl,i,t 
 
The average relative stock recommendation profitability of analyst l in industry i in year t. 
First, stock recommendation profitability is calculated as (negative one times) the market-
adjusted buy-and-hold return to the analyst’s strong buy or buy (hold, sell, or strong sell) 
recommendations, where the return window is her [current recommendation announcement 
date +2, min(current recommendation announcement date +364, next recommendation 
announcement date -2)]; next, the stock recommendation profitability of all analysts 
following the same company are ranked such that the most profitable analyst receives a rank 
of 100 and the least profitable analyst receives a rank of zero; last, for analyst l, we take the 
average of her ranks across all of the companies she covers in industry i during year t. 
Ind_MVl,i,t The normalized ranking of market cap covered by analyst l in industry i in year t. We rank 
the total market cap of covered companies of all analysts in industry i in year t such that the 
analyst covering the highest total market cap in the industry receives a rank of 100, and the 
one covering the lowest total market cap receives a rank of zero. 
Ind_Freql,i,t The normalized ranking of report frequency by analyst l in industry i in year t. We rank the 
earnings forecast frequency of all analysts in industry i in year t such that the analyst issuing 
the most forecasts in the industry receives a rank of 100, and the one issuing the least 
receives a rank of zero. 
Report_CARl,i,t 
 
The average market reaction to the analyst reports issued by analyst l for companies in 
industry i in year t. The market reaction to each analyst report is measured as the cumulative 
absolute three-day market-adjusted return centered on the analyst’s earnings forecast revision 
date; next, we calculate the average market reaction of all analyst reports issued by the 
analyst for companies in industry i in year t. 
Accuracy_Revl,i,t The average relative sales forecast accuracy of analyst l in industry i in year t, following 
Hong et al. (2000). First, absolute sales forecast error is calculated as the absolute value of 
the difference between the analyst’s last forecasted sales issued at least one month prior to 
the fiscal year end and the actual sales; then, we follow the same normalization process as for 
Accuracyl,i,t and take the average of her ranks across all of the companies she covers in 
industry i during year t. 
Accuracy_Expl,i,t The average relative expense forecast accuracy of analyst l in industry i in year t, following 
Hong et al. (2000). First, we infer analyst l’s expense forecast by her last (sales forecast 
minus EBITDA forecast) and then calculate absolute expense forecast error by comparing 
with (actual sales minus actual EBITDA); then, we follow the same normalization process as 
for Accuracyl,i,t and take the average of her ranks across all of the companies she covers in 





The sum of the importance to industry i of all industries covered by other analysts who work 
in the same brokerage as analyst l in year t, and have above or equal to sample median of (1) 
Accuracy, (2) Rec_Profit, (3) Ind_Expr, or (4) number of years working in the same 
brokerage, respectively.  
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The sum of the importance to industry i of all industries covered by other analysts who work 
in the same brokerage as analyst l in year t, and have below sample median of (1) Accuracy, 






The sum of the importance to industry i of all industries covered by other analysts who work 
in the same brokerage as analyst l in year t, and (1) are awarded the Institutional Investor All 






The sum of the importance to industry i of all industries covered by other analysts who work 
in the same brokerage as analyst l in year t, and (1) are not awarded the Institutional Investor 
All Star analyst status in year t, (2) work in different cities, or (3) graduated from different 
institutions, respectively. 
IC_Upstreaml,i,t The sum of upstream importance to industry i of all industries covered by other analysts who 
work in the same brokerage as analyst l in year t. The upstream importance of industry j to 
industry i in year t is the ratio of the sum of industry i’s input commodities made by industry 
j to industry i’s total output. That is, 𝑈𝑝𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑚_𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒
𝑖,𝑗,𝑡
=
∑ (𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑘 𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑑 𝑏𝑦 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑖×% 𝑜𝑓 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑘 𝑚𝑎𝑑𝑒 𝑏𝑦 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑗)𝑘
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑖
  
IC_Downstreaml,i,t The sum of downstream importance to industry i of all industries covered by other analysts 
who work in the same brokerage as analyst l in year t. The downstream importance of 
industry j to industry i in year t is the ratio of the sum of industry i’s output commodities 
used by industry j to industry i’s total output. That is, 𝐷𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑚_𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒
𝑖,𝑗,𝑡
=
∑ (𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑘 𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑑 𝑏𝑦 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑗×% 𝑜𝑓 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑘 𝑚𝑎𝑑𝑒 𝑏𝑦 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑖)𝑘
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑖
  
Ind_Exprl,i,t The number of years of following industry i for analyst l in year t. 
NFirml,i,t The number of companies followed by analyst l in industry i in year t.  
Freql,i,t The average number of reports issued per covered company by analyst l in industry i in year 
t. 
Horizonl,i,t The average number of days between analyst l’s last earnings forecasts and the earnings 
announcement dates for all companies she follows in industry i in year t.  
MVl,i,t The average log market cap of companies followed by analyst l in industry i in year t. 
MTBl,i,t The average market-to-book ratio of companies followed by analyst l in industry i in year t. 
ROAl,i,t The average return on assets of companies followed by analyst l in industry i in year t, where 
return on assets is calculated as income before extraordinary items divided by total assets of a 
company. 
Post_Hiringl,i,t An indicator variable that equals one for the year of hiring a colleague who covers an 
important industry that was not previously covered by the broker of analyst l. An important 
industry is one with an above median importance to industry i covered by analyst l. 
Post_Departurel,i,t An indicator variable that equals one for the subsequent year of the departure of a colleague 
who covers an important industry from the broker of analyst l. An important industry is one 
with an above median importance to industry i covered by analyst l. 
 
Analyst-year level variables: 
Ind_Connectl,t The value of Ind_Connectl,i,t where industry i is the industry with the largest market cap 
covered by analyst l in year t. 
Connectedl,t An indicator variable that equals one if analyst l has a colleague who covers an important 
industry in year t and zero otherwise. An important industry is one with an above median 
𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 to the industry covered by analyst l. 
Starl,t An indicator variable that equals one if analyst l is voted as an Institutional Investor All Star 
analyst in year t and zero otherwise. 
BSizel,t The number of analysts working at analyst l‘s brokerage firm in year t. 
Ind_Exprl,t The value of Ind_Exprl,i,t where industry i is the industry with the largest market cap covered 
by analyst l in year t. 
NIndl,t The number of industries followed by analyst l in year t. 
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NFirml,t The number of companies followed by analyst l in year t.  
Freql,t The number of reports issued by analyst l in year t. 
Horizonl,t The average number of days between analyst l’s last earnings forecasts and the earnings 
announcement dates for all of the companies she follows in year t. 
MVl,t The average log market cap of companies followed by analyst l in year t. 
MTBl,t The average market-to-book ratio of companies followed by analyst l in year t. 
ROAl,t The average return on assets of companies followed by analyst l in year t. 
Accuracyl,t The average relative earnings forecast accuracy of analyst l in year t, following Hong et al. 
(2000). Similar to Accuracyl,i,t, the absolute forecast errors of all analysts following the same 
company are calculated and ranked; then, for analyst l, we take the average of her ranks 
across all of the companies she covers during year t. 
Optimisml,t The average company-level optimism dummy variable for analyst l during year t, following 
Hong and Kubik (2003). First, the optimism dummy variable equals one when analyst l’s last 
earnings forecast for the company is greater than the consensus forecast of all other analysts 
following the same company and zero otherwise; next, we take the average of the optimism 
dummies across all of the companies analyst l covers in year t.  
Boldl,t The average of the normalized ranking of the forecast deviation for analyst l in year t, 
following Hong et al. (2000). First, forecast deviation is defined as the absolute value of the 
difference between analyst l’s last earnings forecast for the company and the consensus of all 
other analysts; next, the forecast deviation of all analysts following the same company are 
ranked such that the boldest analyst receives a rank of 100 and the least bold analyst receives 
a rank of zero; last, we take the average of analyst l’s ranks across all of the companies she 
covers in year t. 
  
Analyst-firm-year level variables: 
Report_Issuancel,p,t 
 
An indicator variable that equals one if analyst l issues a report for company p in year t in [-
1, 1] window of the event date. The event dates are the dates that analyst l’s colleague (or if 
analyst l is a non-connected analyst, her matched analyst’s colleague) who covers an 
important industry issues a report for her largest covered firm. An important industry is one 
with an above median 𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 to the industry covered by analyst l. 
Firm_Freql,p,t The number of reports issued by analyst l for company p in year t. 
Firm_Horizonl,p,t The number of days between the event date and the earnings announcement date for 
company p in year t. The event dates are the dates that analyst l’s colleague (or if analyst l is 
a non-connected analyst, her matched analyst’s colleague) who covers an important industry 
issues a report for her largest covered firm. An important industry is one with an above 
median 𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 to the industry covered by analyst l. 
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This table presents the sample construction procedure for the analyst earnings forecast accuracy test. 
 









Number of analysts 
Analyst-firm-years with EPS forecasts, 1982-2017 1,352,841  27,071 
Retain: firms with GVKEY 652,466  20,357 
Aggregate to analyst-industry-years through averaging 
analyst-firm-years by BEA industries 
 237,635 20,357 
Retain: at least one covered firm has actual earnings 
per share and other analysts following to calculate 
average relative earnings forecast accuracy 
 233,771  20,202 
Retain: at least one covered firm has actual earnings 
announcement date to calculate average forecast 
horizon  
 230,209 20,015 
Retain: at least one covered firm has financial 
information to calculate control variables 
 221,484 19,483 
Retain: brokerage firms and industry-years with 
multiple observations  
 221,328 19,399 
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Descriptive Statistics  
 
Panel A: Sample for analyst-industry-year level analysis  
 
This panel presents the descriptive statistics for the sample used in the analyst-industry-year level analysis (i.e., 
analyst performance tests). The sample size for dependent variable varies across tests, and the descriptive statistics 
for control variables are based on the sample for the earnings forecast accuracy test. Variable definitions are in the 
Appendix. 
 
Variable N Mean Stdev Q1 Median Q3 
Importance 144,540 0.015 0.029 0.001 0.004 0.014 
Ind_Connect 221,328 0.698 0.439 0.385 0.658 0.952 
Accuracy 221,328 54.901 29.413 33.333 57.143 76.965 
Rec_Profit 95,168 50.346 32.776 27.273 50.000 71.944 
Ind_MV 221,328 48.731 28.944 23.810 48.341 73.430 
Ind_Freq 221,328 47.645 32.203 19.388 47.645 76.056 
Report_CAR 205,895 0.047 0.035 0.023 0.038 0.062 
Accuracy_Rev 50,180 48.616 30.932 25.000 50.000 70.977 
Accuracy_Exp 32,282 48.804 30.995 25.000 50.000 71.399 
BSize 221,328 48.045 43.754 14.000 34.000 74.000 
Ind_Expr 221,328 4.424 3.956 1.000 3.000 6.000 
NInd 221,328 3.486 2.340 2.000 3.000 5.000 
NFirm 221,328 2.711 2.930 1.000 1.000 3.000 
Freq 221,328 3.197 1.750 2.000 3.000 4.000 
Horizon 221,328 155.395 76.564 101.000 120.200 191.000 
MV 221,328 7.754 1.816 6.509 7.780 9.017 
MTB 221,328 3.482 4.339 1.641 2.571 4.122 
ROA 221,328 0.036 0.104 0.015 0.051 0.086 
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Table 2 (Cont’d) 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
Panel B: Sample for analyst-year level analysis 
 
This panel presents the descriptive statistics for the sample used in the analyst-year level analysis (i.e., All-Star 
status test). Variable definitions are in the Appendix.  
 
Variable N Mean Stdev Q1 Median Q3 
Ind_Connect 72,033 0.748 0.381 0.471 0.731 0.990 
Star 72,033 0.144 0.351 0.000 0.000 0.000 
BSize 72,033 60.945 45.996 24.000 48.000 92.000 
Ind_Expr 72,033 4.836 4.262 2.000 3.000 7.000 
NInd 72,033 2.173 1.540 1.000 2.000 3.000 
NFirm 72,033 6.162 5.324 2.000 5.000 9.000 
Freq 72,033 23.103 25.590 5.000 13.000 32.000 
Horizon 72,033 158.013 72.517 105.889 130.600 188.600 
MV 72,033 8.253 1.664 7.178 8.339 9.427 
MTB 72,033 3.472 3.902 1.746 2.693 4.183 
ROA 72,033 0.032 0.098 0.014 0.049 0.081 
Accuracy 72,033 55.331 23.180 42.128 57.971 70.455 
Optimism 72,033 0.495 0.318 0.286 0.500 0.706 
Bold 72,033 45.070 22.693 30.797 42.918 57.689 
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Table 2 (Cont’d) 
Descriptive Statistics  
 
Panel C: Pearson correlation table  
 
This panel presents the Pearson correlation table based on the sample used in the analyst-industry-year level analysis. Bold face indicates significance at the 5% 
level. 
 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
(1) Ind_Connect 1               
(2) Accuracy 0.02 1              
(3) Rec_Profit 0.01 0.02 1             
(4) Ind_MV 0.12 0.03 0.02 1            
(5) Ind_Freq 0.09 0.16 0.03 0.50 1           
(6) Report_CAR 0.11 0.02 -0.00 -0.15 0.00 1          
(7) Star 0.14 0.06 0.01 0.16 0.15 -0.06 1         
(8) BSize 0.56 0.02 0.01 0.16 0.10 0.05 0.30 1        
(9) Ind_Expr 0.08 0.02 0.01 0.29 0.33 -0.00 0.18 0.06 1       
(10) NInd 0.07 0.02 0.01 -0.10 -0.05 0.02 0.02 -0.06 0.09 1      
(11) NFirm 0.08 0.03 0.02 0.46 0.62 -0.01 0.07 0.09 0.39 -0.16 1     
(12) Freq 0.13 0.18 0.04 0.14 0.61 0.05 0.12 0.14 0.20 0.07 0.19 1    
(13) Horizon -0.06 -0.37 -0.04 -0.08 -0.36 -0.02 -0.09 -0.05 -0.07 -0.08 -0.10 -0.50 1   
(14) MV 0.14 -0.01 0.03 0.71 0.22 -0.18 0.11 0.21 0.26 -0.08 0.27 0.19 -0.10 1  
(15) MTB 0.05 0.01 -0.00 0.13 -0.01 0.06 -0.00 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.01 -0.02 -0.02 0.20 1 
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Information Sharing and Analyst Performance  
 
This table reports the relation between an analyst’s performance in an industry and the economic connectedness of the 
industries covered by her colleague to that industry. We estimate the OLS regressions 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦(𝑅𝑒𝑐_𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡) =
𝑓(𝐼𝑛𝑑_𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑐𝑡, 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙_𝐴𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡, 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙_𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚) + 𝜀  in columns (1) and (2), and 𝐼𝑛𝑑_𝑀𝑉(𝐼𝑛𝑑_𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑞) =
𝑓(𝐼𝑛𝑑_𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑐𝑡, 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙_𝐴𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡) + 𝜀  in columns (3) and (4). 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙_𝐴𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡  includes 𝐵𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 , 𝐼𝑛𝑑_𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑟 , 
𝑁𝐼𝑛𝑑, and 𝑁𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚; 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙_𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 includes 𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑞, 𝐻𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑧𝑜𝑛, 𝑀𝑉, 𝑀𝑇𝐵, and 𝑅𝑂𝐴. t-stats based on standard errors 
estimated clustered by analyst and industry-year are reported in parentheses below the coefficients. *, **, and *** 
indicate two-tailed significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Variable definitions are in the Appendix. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variable Accuracy Rec_Profit Ind_MV Ind_Freq 
Ind_Connect 1.6757*** 1.2239* 0.8727* 0.7667* 
 (4.44) (1.90) (1.67) (1.66) 
BSize -0.0246*** -0.0036 0.0062 -0.0270*** 
 (-4.73) (-0.40) (0.67) (-4.21) 
Ind_Expr 0.0323* -0.0030 1.0323*** 0.8056*** 
 (1.72) (-0.11) (19.44) (26.27) 
NInd 0.2221*** 0.1793*** -0.3921*** 0.9362*** 
 (5.40) (2.59) (-4.93) (15.06) 
NFirm 0.0849*** 0.0738* 4.9324*** 7.4001*** 
 (3.64) (1.93) (24.53) (53.77) 
Freq 0.3415*** 0.4610***   
 (7.02) (6.08)   
Horizon -0.1397*** -0.0137***   
 (-87.59) (-7.22)   
MV -0.3692*** 0.3444***   
 (-6.89) (4.10)   
MTB 0.0484*** -0.0317   
 (3.10) (-1.43)   
ROA 5.7983*** 1.9187*   
 (7.68) (1.89)   
Broker FE Included Included Included Included 
Industry-Year FE Included Included Included Included 
N 221,328 95,168 221,328 221,328 
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Information Sharing and Analyst Performance:  
Conditional on Colleague Research Quality 
This table reports the relation between an analyst’s performance in an industry and the economic connectedness of the 
industries covered by her colleague to that industry, conditional on colleague research quality. We estimate the OLS 
regressions 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦(𝑅𝑒𝑐_𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡) = 𝑓(𝐼𝐶_𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ_𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦, 𝐼𝐶_𝐿𝑜𝑤_𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦, 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙_𝐴𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡, 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙_𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚) + 𝜀  in 
columns (1) and (2), and 𝐼𝑛𝑑_𝑀𝑉(𝐼𝑛𝑑_𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑞) = 𝑓(𝐼𝐶_𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑔_𝑇𝑖𝑒𝑠, 𝐼𝐶_𝑊𝑒𝑎𝑘_𝑇𝑖𝑒𝑠, 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙_𝐴𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡) + 𝜀 in columns (3) 
and (4). 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙_𝐴𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡 includes 𝐵𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 , 𝐼𝑛𝑑_𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑟 , 𝑁𝐼𝑛𝑑 , and 𝑁𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 ; 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙_𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 includes 𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑞 , 𝐻𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑧𝑜𝑛 , 𝑀𝑉 , 
𝑀𝑇𝐵 , and 𝑅𝑂𝐴 . 𝐼𝐶_𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ_𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 and 𝐼𝐶_𝐿𝑜𝑤_𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 are 𝐼𝐶_𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ_𝐴𝑐𝑐 and 𝐼𝐶_𝐿𝑜𝑤_𝐴𝑐𝑐 in Panel A, 𝐼𝐶_𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ_𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡 
and 𝐼𝐶_𝐿𝑜𝑤_𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡 in Panel B, 𝐼𝐶_𝐿𝑜𝑛𝑔_𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑟 and 𝐼𝐶_𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡_𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑟 in Panel C, and 𝐼𝐶_𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑟 and 𝐼𝐶_𝑁𝑜𝑛𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑟 in Panel D. 
t-stats based on standard errors estimated clustered by analyst and industry-year are reported in parentheses below the 
coefficients. *, **, and *** indicate two-tailed significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Variable definitions 
are in the Appendix. 
Panel A: Colleague earnings forecast accuracy  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variable Accuracy Rec_Profit Ind_MV Ind_Freq 
IC_High_Acc 2.4375*** 0.7264 0.3363 5.1189*** 
 (4.50) (0.78) (0.49) (7.81) 
IC_Low_Acc 0.6517 1.4015 1.2035* -4.6547*** 
 (1.13) (1.51) (1.88) (-7.14) 
Controls, Broker, Industry-Year FE Included Included Included Included 
N 212,547 91,819 212,547 212,547 
Adj. R-squared 0.161 0.020 0.414 0.474 
F-statistic from testing β1 = β2 4.80** 0.28 1.57 131.21*** 
 
Panel B: Colleague recommendation profitability  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variable Accuracy Rec_Profit Ind_MV Ind_Freq 
IC_High_Profit 1.4837*** 1.7314** 0.6636 2.1567*** 
 (2.72) (2.16) (0.94) (3.61) 
IC_Low_Profit 1.6624*** -0.3247 1.2145* -1.0769* 
 (3.19) (-0.40) (1.83) (-1.66) 
Controls, Broker, Industry-Year FE Included Included Included Included 
N 167,615 90,617 167,615 167,615 
Adj. R-squared 0.168 0.017 0.417 0.493 
F-statistic from testing β1 = β2 0.09 4.18** 0.99 27.88*** 
 
Panel C: Colleague industry experience 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variable Accuracy Rec_Profit Ind_MV Ind_Freq 
IC_Long_Expr 3.0432*** 1.0720 2.3686*** 2.1951*** 
 (5.87) (1.32) (3.36) (3.66) 
IC_Short_Expr 0.1822 1.0001 -0.9504 -1.2873** 
 (0.34) (1.00) (-1.47) (-2.05) 
Controls, Broker, Industry-Year FE Included Included Included Included 
N 217,046 93,500 217,046 217,046 
Adj. R-squared 0.161 0.021 0.416 0.477 
F-statistic from testing β1 = β2 15.88*** 0.00 17.66*** 19.57*** 
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Table 4 (Cont’d) 
Information Sharing and Analyst Performance:  
Conditional on Colleague Research Quality 
 
Panel D: Colleague All-Star status 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variable Accuracy Rec_Profit Ind_MV Ind_Freq 
IC_Star 1.6175** 2.2416* -0.0911 -0.1148 
 (2.21) (1.87) (-0.09) (-0.13) 
IC_Non_Star 1.8309*** 0.8524 0.9900* 0.6035 
 (4.59) (1.25) (1.74) (1.26) 
Controls, Broker, Industry-Year FE Included Included Included Included 
N 217,046 93,500 217,046 217,046 
Adj. R-squared 0.161 0.021 0.416 0.477 
F-statistic from testing β1 = β2 0.09 1.31 1.16 0.67 
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Information Sharing and Analyst Performance:  
Conditional on Colleague Relation Strength  
 
This table reports the relation between an analyst’s performance in an industry and the economic connectedness of the 
industries covered by her colleague to that industry, conditional on her relation strength with colleagues. We estimate the OLS 
regressions 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦(𝑅𝑒𝑐_𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡) = 𝑓(𝐼𝐶_𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑔_𝑇𝑖𝑒𝑠, 𝐼𝐶_𝑊𝑒𝑎𝑘_𝑇𝑖𝑒𝑠, 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙_𝐴𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡, 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙_𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚) + 𝜀  in 
columns (1) and (2), and 𝐼𝑛𝑑_𝑀𝑉(𝐼𝑛𝑑_𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑞) = 𝑓(𝐼𝐶_𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑔_𝑇𝑖𝑒𝑠, 𝐼𝐶_𝑊𝑒𝑎𝑘_𝑇𝑖𝑒𝑠, 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙_𝐴𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡) + 𝜀 in columns (3) 
and (4). 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙_𝐴𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡 includes 𝐵𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 , 𝐼𝑛𝑑_𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑟 , 𝑁𝐼𝑛𝑑 , and 𝑁𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 ; 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙_𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 includes 𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑞 , 𝐻𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑧𝑜𝑛 , 𝑀𝑉 , 
𝑀𝑇𝐵 , and 𝑅𝑂𝐴 . 𝐼𝐶_𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑔_𝑇𝑖𝑒𝑠  and 𝐼𝐶_𝑊𝑒𝑎𝑘_𝑇𝑖𝑒𝑠  are 𝐼𝐶_𝐿𝑜𝑛𝑔_𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛  and 𝐼𝐶_𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡_𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛  in Panel A, 
𝐼𝐶_𝑆𝑎𝑚𝑒_𝐶𝑖𝑡𝑦 and 𝐼𝐶_𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓_𝐶𝑖𝑡𝑦 in Panel B, and 𝐼𝐶_𝑆𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙_𝑇𝑖𝑒𝑠 and 𝐼𝐶_𝑁𝑜_𝑆𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙_𝑇𝑖𝑒𝑠 in Panel C. t-stats based on 
standard errors estimated clustered by analyst and industry-year are reported in parentheses below the coefficients. *, **, and 
*** indicate two-tailed significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Variable definitions are in the Appendix. 
Panel A: Relation length 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variable Accuracy Rec_Profit Ind_MV Ind_Freq 
IC_Long_Relation 1.5852*** 1.6086** 1.2041* 4.0056*** 
 (3.74) (2.15) (1.90) (7.67) 
IC_Short_Relation 1.7300*** 1.0543 0.8329 -0.6276 
 (4.42) (1.62) (1.52) (-1.33) 
Controls, Broker, Industry-Year FE Included Included Included Included 
N 221,328 95,168 221,328 221,328 
Adj. R-squared 0.161 0.023 0.418 0.480 
F-statistic from testing β1 = β2 0.24 1.35 0.98 174.78*** 
 
Panel B: Colleague location 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variable Accuracy Rec_Profit Ind_MV Ind_Freq 
IC_Same_City 2.5324*** 3.0193** 3.5677*** 3.6362*** 
 (3.09) (2.26) (2.82) (3.63) 
IC_Diff_City 0.3851 1.5390 1.1017 0.4756 
 (0.52) (1.47) (1.08) (0.55) 
Controls, Broker, Industry-Year FE Included Included Included Included 
N 72,178 37,296 72,178 72,178 
Adj. R-squared 0.159 0.026 0.468 0.545 
F-statistic from testing β1 = β2 8.01*** 1.98 5.68** 13.18*** 
 
Panel C: Educational ties  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variable Accuracy Rec_Profit Ind_MV Ind_Freq 
IC_School_Ties 1.8659* 4.7567*** 2.5143* 3.7473*** 
 (1.90) (3.18) (1.75) (3.14) 
IC_No_School_Ties 1.1751* 1.0513 1.2431 0.6322 
 (1.66) (0.98) (1.29) (0.78) 
Controls, Broker, Industry-Year FE Included Included Included Included 
N 73,614 37,945 73,614 73,614 
Adj. R-squared 0.158 0.026 0.466 0.545 
F-statistic from testing β1 = β2 0.75 9.78*** 1.04 9.30*** 
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Information Sharing and Investor Recognition 
 
This table reports the relation between investor recognition of an analyst and the economic connectedness of the 
industries covered by her colleague to her industry. We estimate the OLS regression 𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡_𝐶𝐴𝑅 =
𝑓(𝐼𝑛𝑑_𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑐𝑡, 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙_𝐴𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡, 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙_𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚) + 𝜀 in column (1). We estimate the Probit regression 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑟 =
𝑓(𝐼𝑛𝑑_𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑐𝑡, 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙_𝐴𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡, 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙_𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚, 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙_𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑟) + 𝜀  in column (2). 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙_𝐴𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡  includes 
𝐵𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 , 𝐼𝑛𝑑_𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑟 , 𝑁𝐼𝑛𝑑 , and 𝑁𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 ; 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙_𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚  includes 𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑞 , 𝐻𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑧𝑜𝑛 , 𝑀𝑉 , 𝑀𝑇𝐵 , and 𝑅𝑂𝐴 ; 
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙_𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑟 includes 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦, 𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑚, and 𝐵𝑜𝑙𝑑. t and z-stats based on standard errors estimated clustered 
by analyst and industry-year are reported in parentheses below the coefficients. *, **, and *** indicate two-tailed 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Variable definitions are in the Appendix. 
 
 (1) (2) 
Variable Report_CAR Star 
Ind_Connect 0.0025*** 0.3301*** 
 (4.69) (3.05) 
BSize 0.0000*** 0.0032*** 
 (3.29) (4.20) 
Ind_Expr -0.0001** 0.1140*** 
 (-2.27) (26.67) 
NInd 0.0000 0.0622*** 
 (0.27) (4.54) 
NFirm 0.0002*** 0.0169** 
 (3.27) (2.43) 
Freq 0.0009*** 0.0133*** 
 (10.88) (10.43) 
Horizon 0.0000*** -0.0013*** 
 (2.75) (-7.65) 
MV -0.0042*** 0.1432*** 
 (-28.97) (9.91) 
MTB 0.0003*** -0.0022 
 (5.54) (-0.68) 
ROA -0.0411*** -0.3468* 
 (-17.00) (-1.79) 
Accuracy  0.0025*** 
  (4.77) 
Optimism  -0.0470 
  (-1.47) 
Bold  -0.0001 
  (-0.22) 
Broker FE Included Included 
Industry-Year FE Included Included 
N 205,895 72,033 
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Information Sharing and Analyst Report Issuance 
 
This table reports the relation between whether an analyst has a highly-connected colleague and her issuing a report 
for a firm during [-1, +1] of the event date. In column (1), the event date is the day that the analyst’s highly-connected 
colleague (or her matched analyst’s highly-connected colleague if she does not have one) issues a report. In columns 
(2) and (3), the event date is 45 days before and after the day that the analyst’s highly-connected colleague (or her 
matched analyst’s highly-connected colleague if she does not have one) issues a report, respectively. t-stats based on 
standard errors estimated clustered by analyst and industry-year are reported in parentheses below the coefficients. *, 
**, and *** indicate two-tailed significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Variable definitions are in 
Appendix. 
 





Placebo test:  
Highly-connected 
colleague’s report 
issuance date  




issuance date  
+45 days 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Variable Report_Issuance Report_Issuance Report_Issuance 
Connect 0.0641*** -0.0024 -0.0068 
 (7.36) (-0.49) (-1.35) 
BSize 0.0001 0.0003 0.0004* 
 (0.35) (1.34) (1.77) 
Ind_Expr 0.0004 -0.0003 -0.0033*** 
 (0.33) (-0.32) (-3.37) 
NInd 0.0018 0.0001 0.0016 
 (0.97) (0.03) (1.35) 
NFirm -0.0013 0.0001 0.0028** 
 (-1.01) (0.11) (2.20) 
Firm_Freq 0.0474*** 0.0237*** 0.0238*** 
 (27.23) (13.48) (13.67) 
Firm_Horizon 0.0000 -0.0000*** 0.0001*** 
 (0.20) (-3.86) (5.87) 
Broker FE Included Included Included 
Industry-Year FE Included Included Included 
N 186,652 186,652 186,652 
Adj. R-squared 0.199 0.206 0.216 
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Upstream and Downstream Industry Information Sharing and Forecast Accuracy 
 
This table reports the relation between an analyst’s revenue and expense forecast accuracy in an industry and the 
upstream and downstream economic connectedness of the industries covered by her colleague to that industry. We 
estimate the OLS regression 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦_𝑅𝑒𝑣 = 𝑓(𝐼𝐶_𝑈𝑝𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑚, 𝐼𝐶_𝐷𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑚, 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙_𝐴𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡,
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙_𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 ) + 𝜀  in column (1) and 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦_𝐸𝑥𝑝 = 𝑓(𝐼𝐶_𝑈𝑝𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑚, 𝐼𝐶_𝐷𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑚,
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙_𝐴𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡, 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙_𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚, 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦_𝑅𝑒𝑣) + 𝜀  (2). 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙_𝐴𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡  includes 𝐵𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 , 𝐼𝑛𝑑_𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑟 , 𝑁𝐼𝑛𝑑 , 
and 𝑁𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚; 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙_𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 includes 𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑞, 𝐻𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑧𝑜𝑛, 𝑀𝑉, 𝑀𝑇𝐵, and 𝑅𝑂𝐴. t-stats based on standard errors estimated 
clustered by analyst and industry-year are reported in parentheses below the coefficients. *, **, and *** indicate two-
tailed significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Variable definitions are in the Appendix. 
 
 (1) (2) 
Variable Accuracy_Rev Accuracy_Exp 
IC_Upstream -0.3639 3.0804* 
 (-0.24) (1.68) 
IC_Downstream 1.8624** 1.4467 
 (2.53) (1.09) 
BSize 0.0156 -0.0137 
 (0.83) (-0.71) 
Ind_Expr -0.0215 -0.0265 
 (-0.50) (-0.49) 
NInd -0.0571 0.0464 
 (-0.66) (0.64) 
Ind_NFirm -0.0420 0.0220 
 (-0.88) (0.31) 
Freq -0.1889 -0.2424* 
 (-1.55) (-1.92) 
Horizon -0.1451*** -0.0458*** 
 (-32.13) (-9.43) 
MV -0.3721*** -0.0355 
 (-3.08) (-0.29) 
MTB -0.0273 -0.0369 
 (-0.95) (-1.46) 
ROA -3.3457 -2.1346*** 
 (-1.38) (-3.61) 
Accuracy_Rev  0.4470*** 
  (16.07) 
Broker FE Included Included 
Industry-Year FE Included Included 
N 50,180 32,282 
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Information Sharing’s Effect on Analyst Performance and Investor Recognition:  
Turnovers of Colleagues Covering Important Industries 
Panel A: Hiring of Important Colleagues 
This panel reports the change in an analyst’s performance and investor recognition in an industry before and after the 
hiring of a colleague who covers industries of high economic importance to that industry. We estimate the OLS 
regressions 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦(𝑅𝑒𝑐_𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡, 𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡_𝐶𝐴𝑅) = 𝑓(𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡_𝐻𝑖𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔, 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙_𝐴𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡, 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙_𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚) + 𝜀  in 
columns (1), (2) and (5), 𝐼𝑛𝑑_𝑀𝑉(𝐼𝑛𝑑_𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑞) = 𝑓(𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡_𝐻𝑖𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔, 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙_𝐴𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡) + 𝜀 in columns (3) and (4), and 
the Probit regression 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑟 = 𝑓(𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡_𝐻𝑖𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔, 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙_𝐴𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡, 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙_𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚, 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙_𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑟) + 𝜀  in column (6). 
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙_𝐴𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡  includes 𝐵𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 , 𝐼𝑛𝑑_𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑟 , 𝑁𝐼𝑛𝑑 , and 𝑁𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 ; 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙_𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚  includes 𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑞 , 𝐻𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑧𝑜𝑛 , 𝑀𝑉 , 
𝑀𝑇𝐵, and 𝑅𝑂𝐴; 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙_𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑟 includes 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦, 𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑚, and 𝐵𝑜𝑙𝑑. The sample includes the year of the hiring 
of an important colleague and the prior year. t and z-stats based on standard errors estimated clustered by analyst and 
industry-year are reported in parentheses below the coefficients. *, **, and *** indicate two-tailed significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Variable definitions are in the Appendix. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Variable Accuracy Rec_Profit Ind_MV Ind_Freq Report_CAR Star 
Post_Hiring 0.6153* 0.5090** 0.4388* 6.6232*** 0.0010** 0.0007 
 (1.71) (1.96) (1.72) (16.41) (2.63) (0.08) 
BSize -0.0434 0.0102 0.0048 -0.0549** -0.0001*** -0.0000 
 (-1.32) (0.18) (0.17) (-2.20) (-3.15) (-0.02) 
Ind_Expr -0.0797 -0.0464 0.9093*** 0.5940*** -0.0000 0.0085*** 
 (-1.15) (-0.26) (9.45) (7.82) (-0.23) (4.63) 
NInd 0.0935 0.2002 -0.4795** 0.1469 0.0001 0.0139** 
 (0.83) (0.68) (-2.12) (1.13) (0.46) (2.50) 
NFirm 0.0109 0.0322 4.5569*** 6.3026*** 0.0003*** -0.0018 
 (0.16) (0.22) (19.27) (21.56) (3.44) (-0.58) 
Freq 0.3294 0.7165***   0.0009*** 0.0016*** 
 (1.44) (3.27)   (2.89) (2.78) 
Horizon -0.0921*** 0.0046   0.0000 -0.0002 
 (-13.99) (0.34)   (0.83) (-1.22) 
MV -0.1954 -0.1448   -0.0050*** 0.0118** 
 (-0.92) (-0.26)   (-14.55) (2.39) 
MTB 0.1820** 0.0323   0.0005*** -0.0005 
 (2.28) (0.22)   (3.04) (-0.33) 
ROA 8.9517*** 6.8694   -0.0401*** -0.0313 
 (3.08) (1.26)   (-5.86) (-0.54) 
Accuracy      0.0002 
      (0.48) 
Optimism      0.0097 
      (0.56) 
Bold      0.0001 
      (0.39) 
Broker, Industry-Year FE Included Included Included Included Included Included 
N 14,223 7,224 14,223 14,223 14,026 4,796 
Adj./Pseudo R-squared 0.097 0.033 0.445 0.518 0.409 0.361 
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Table 9 (Cont’d) 
Information Sharing’s Effect on Analyst Performance and Investor Recognition:  
Turnovers of Colleagues Covering Important Industries 
Panel B: Departure of Important Colleagues 
This panel reports the change in an analyst’s performance and investor recognition in an industry before and after the 
departure of a colleague who covers industries of high economic importance to that industry. We estimate the OLS 
regressions 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦(𝑅𝑒𝑐_𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡, 𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡_𝐶𝐴𝑅) = 𝑓(𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡_𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒, 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙_𝐴𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡, 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙_𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚) + 𝜀 in 
columns (1), (2) and (5), 𝐼𝑛𝑑_𝑀𝑉(𝐼𝑛𝑑_𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑞) = 𝑓(𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡_𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒, 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙_𝐴𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡) + 𝜀 in columns (3) and (4), 
and the Probit regression 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑟 = 𝑓(𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡_𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒, 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙_𝐴𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡, 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙_𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚, 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙_𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑟) + 𝜀  in 
column (6). 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙_𝐴𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡  includes 𝐵𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 , 𝐼𝑛𝑑_𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑟 , 𝑁𝐼𝑛𝑑 , and 𝑁𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 ; 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙_𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚  includes 𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑞 , 
𝐻𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑧𝑜𝑛 , 𝑀𝑉 , 𝑀𝑇𝐵 , and 𝑅𝑂𝐴 ; 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙_𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑟 includes 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦 , 𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑚 , and 𝐵𝑜𝑙𝑑 . The sample includes the 
year of the departure of an important colleague and the subsequent year. t and z-stats based on standard errors estimated 
clustered by analyst and industry-year are reported in parentheses below the coefficients. *, **, and *** indicate two-
tailed significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Variable definitions are in the Appendix. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Variable Accuracy Rec_Profit Ind_MV Ind_Freq Report_CAR Star 
Post_Departure -2.0570*** -1.8190*** -0.2639 -6.1194*** 0.0006 0.0179 
 (-6.52) (-3.32) (-0.94) (-13.88) (0.93) (1.40) 
BSize -0.0887*** -0.0008 0.0117 -0.0134 -0.0000 -0.0012 
 (-3.11) (-0.01) (0.32) (-0.38) (-0.55) (-1.48) 
Ind_Expr -0.0235 0.0057 1.0066*** 0.1963** -0.0003*** 0.0202*** 
 (-0.23) (0.04) (9.00) (2.09) (-3.74) (6.15) 
NInd 0.3742* -0.0528 -0.4540 0.5115*** 0.0001 0.0144* 
 (1.74) (-0.14) (-1.68) (2.97) (0.76) (1.72) 
NFirm 0.1695 -0.1401 4.3635*** 6.2896*** 0.0002* -0.0004 
 (1.56) (-0.75) (17.32) (14.92) (2.00) (-0.10) 
Freq 0.2999 0.8631   -0.0002 0.0031*** 
 (1.03) (1.52)   (-0.66) (3.49) 
Horizon -0.1308*** -0.0050   0.0000 -0.0002 
 (-17.04) (-0.34)   (0.34) (-1.08) 
MV -0.2170 -0.5457   -0.0043*** 0.0125* 
 (-0.83) (-1.07)   (-12.79) (1.78) 
MTB 0.0286 -0.0678   0.0006*** 0.0037 
 (0.32) (-0.39)   (3.81) (1.25) 
ROA 12.8468*** -0.3238   -0.0422*** -0.1221 
 (3.41) (-0.04)   (-5.01) (-1.14) 
Accuracy      0.0002 
      (0.49) 
Optimism      -0.0254 
      (-0.87) 
Bold      0.0002 
      (0.66) 
Broker FE Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Industry-Year FE Included Included Included Included Included Included 
N 11,818 5,222 11,818 11,818 11,283 3,941 
Adj./Pseudo R-squared 0.186 0.054 0.523 0.505 0.411 0.448 
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Information Sharing and Analyst Performance:  
Within Broker-Year Matched Sample Analysis 
 
This table reports the relation between an analyst’s performance and investor recognition in an industry and the 
economic connectedness of the industries covered by her colleague to that industry using a matched sample. We estimate 
the OLS regressions 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦(𝑅𝑒𝑐_𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡, 𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡_𝐶𝐴𝑅) = 𝑓(𝐼𝑛𝑑_𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑐𝑡, 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙_𝐴𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡,
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙_𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚) + 𝜀 in columns (1), (2) and (5), 𝐼𝑛𝑑_𝑀𝑉(𝐼𝑛𝑑_𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑞) = 𝑓(𝐼𝑛𝑑_𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑐𝑡, 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙_𝐴𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡) + 𝜀 in 
columns (3) and (4), and the Probit regression 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑟 = 𝑓(𝐼𝑛𝑑_𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑐𝑡, 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙_𝐴𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡,
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙_𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚, 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙_𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑟) + 𝜀 in column (6). 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙_𝐴𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡 includes 𝐵𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒, 𝐼𝑛𝑑_𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑟, 𝑁𝐼𝑛𝑑, and 𝑁𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚; 
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙_𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 includes 𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑞 , 𝐻𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑧𝑜𝑛 , 𝑀𝑉 , 𝑀𝑇𝐵 , and 𝑅𝑂𝐴 ; 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙_𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑟 includes 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦 , 𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑚 , and 
𝐵𝑜𝑙𝑑. For a given analyst-industry-year with above broker-year median 𝐼𝑛𝑑_𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑐𝑡, we identify an analyst-industry-
year with below broker-year median 𝐼𝑛𝑑_𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑐𝑡 in the same broker-year and closest quintile-ranks in 𝐼𝑛𝑑_𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑟 and 
𝑁𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 . t and z-stats based on standard errors estimated clustered by analyst and industry-year are reported in 
parentheses below the coefficients. *, **, and *** indicate two-tailed significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively. Variable definitions are in the Appendix. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Variable Accuracy Rec_Profit Ind_MV Ind_Freq Report_CAR Star 
Ind_Connect 0.7438** 1.1303* 1.2840** 1.1404** 0.0046*** 0.2410* 
 (2.01) (1.73) (2.32) (2.28) (6.18) (1.85) 
BSize -0.0238*** -0.0041 0.0029 -0.0323*** 0.0000 0.0026*** 
 (-4.20) (-0.42) (0.40) (-4.88) (1.17) (3.20) 
Ind_Expr 0.0441* 0.0156 1.0191*** 0.8722*** -0.0001*** 0.1256*** 
 (1.84) (0.44) (24.78) (24.21) (-2.64) (26.47) 
NInd 0.2509*** 0.1412* -0.3859*** 0.9724*** 0.0000 0.0611*** 
 (5.36) (1.96) (-5.21) (14.72) (0.15) (3.96) 
NFirm 0.0873*** 0.0866** 5.4961*** 8.0844*** 0.0002*** 0.0264*** 
 (2.91) (2.06) (38.93) (47.24) (3.06) (3.20) 
Freq 0.2725*** 0.4512***   0.0008*** 0.0139*** 
 (5.21) (5.32)   (8.91) (9.27) 
Horizon -0.1384*** -0.0133***   0.0000* -0.0015*** 
 (-81.18) (-6.03)   (1.68) (-7.39) 
MV -0.3454*** 0.3619***   -0.0043*** 0.1530*** 
 (-5.99) (4.40)   (-27.80) (9.44) 
MTB 0.0402** -0.0032   0.0004*** -0.0003 
 (2.34) (-0.14)   (5.91) (-0.08) 
ROA 6.4358*** 0.5198   -0.0433*** -0.5681*** 
 (7.98) (0.52)   (-15.81) (-2.67) 
Accuracy      0.0027*** 
      (4.40) 
Optimism      -0.0529 
      (-1.45) 
Bold      0.0001 
      (0.13) 
Broker FE Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Industry-Year FE Included Included Included Included Included Included 
N 167,340 68,007 167,340 167,340 155,131 49,058 
Adj./Pseudo R-squared 0.156 0.013 0.382 0.426 0.302 0.408 
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Information Sharing’s Effect on Analyst Performance and Investor Recognition:  
Controlling for Direct Coverage of Supplier and Customer Companies  
Panel A: Controlling for the Number of Firms with Direct Suppliers and Customers 
This panel reports the relation between an analyst’s performance and investor recognition in an industry and the 
economic connectedness of the industries covered by her colleague to that industry, controlling for the number of firms 
with direct suppliers and customers covered by the analyst and her colleagues. We estimate the OLS regressions 
𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦(𝑅𝑒𝑐_𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡, 𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡_𝐶𝐴𝑅) = 𝑓(𝐼𝑛𝑑_𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑐𝑡, 𝐷𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑆𝐶_𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑓, 𝐷𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑆𝐶_𝐶𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑔𝑢𝑒, 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙_𝐴𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡, 
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙_𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚) + 𝜀  in columns (1), (2) and (5), 𝐼𝑛𝑑_𝑀𝑉(𝐼𝑛𝑑_𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑞) = 𝑓(𝐼𝑛𝑑_𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑐𝑡, 𝐷𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑆𝐶_𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑓,
𝐷𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑆𝐶_𝐶𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑔𝑢𝑒, 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙_𝐴𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡) + 𝜀  in columns (3) and (4), and the Probit regression 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑟 =
𝑓(𝐼𝑛𝑑_𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑐𝑡, 𝐷𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑆𝐶_𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑓, 𝐷𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑆𝐶_𝐶𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑔𝑢𝑒, 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙_𝐴𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡, 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙_𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚, 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙_𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑟) + 𝜀  in 
column (6). 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙_𝐴𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡  includes 𝐵𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 , 𝐼𝑛𝑑_𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑟 , 𝑁𝐼𝑛𝑑 , and 𝑁𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 ; 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙_𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚  includes 𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑞 , 
𝐻𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑧𝑜𝑛 , 𝑀𝑉 , 𝑀𝑇𝐵 , and 𝑅𝑂𝐴 ; 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙_𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑟  includes 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦 , 𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑚 , and 𝐵𝑜𝑙𝑑 . t and z-stats based on 
standard errors estimated clustered by analyst and industry-year are reported in parentheses below the coefficients. *, **, 
and *** indicate two-tailed significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Variable definitions are in the 
Appendix of the main paper and Table IA5 of the Internet Appendix. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Variable Accuracy Rec_Profit Ind_MV Ind_Freq Report_CAR Star 
Ind_Connect 1.6728*** 1.2327* 0.9174* 0.7708* 0.0025*** 0.3225*** 
 (4.43) (1.91) (1.74) (1.69) (4.70) (2.99) 
DirectSC_Self -0.1698 0.3986** 2.6427*** 0.2406 0.0006** 0.0282 
 (-1.46) (2.01) (10.68) (0.63) (2.28) (1.21) 
DirectSC_Colleague -0.1260 -0.1072 2.1028*** -0.9341*** 0.0010*** 0.0450*** 
 (-1.42) (-0.78) (7.09) (-3.76) (5.02) (3.24) 
BSize -0.0243*** -0.0033 0.0020 -0.0253*** 0.0000*** 0.0031*** 
 (-4.69) (-0.37) (0.22) (-3.92) (2.94) (4.08) 
Ind_Expr 0.0324* -0.0044 1.0205*** 0.8061*** -0.0001** 0.1136*** 
 (1.73) (-0.16) (19.42) (26.30) (-2.25) (26.55) 
NInd 0.2236*** 0.1742** -0.4093*** 0.9326*** 0.0000 0.0737*** 
 (5.43) (2.50) (-5.32) (14.97) (0.26) (5.35) 
NFirm 0.1073*** 0.0665* 4.5529*** 7.4970*** 0.0001 0.0114 
 (4.04) (1.72) (21.02) (52.25) (1.20) (1.61) 
Freq 0.3426*** 0.4592***   0.0009*** 0.0129*** 
 (7.04) (6.06)   (10.80) (10.09) 
Horizon -0.1397*** -0.0136***   0.0000*** -0.0013*** 
 (-87.58) (-7.20)   (2.70) (-7.81) 
MV -0.3600*** 0.3410***   -0.0043*** 0.1372*** 
 (-6.70) (3.98)   (-29.16) (9.50) 
MTB 0.0480*** -0.0313   0.0003*** -0.0026 
 (3.08) (-1.42)   (5.60) (-0.82) 
ROA 5.7591*** 1.9494*   -0.0409*** -0.2788 
 (7.63) (1.92)   (-16.92) (-1.43) 
Accuracy      0.0025*** 
      (4.77) 
Optimism      -0.0492 
      (-1.54) 
Bold      -0.0001 
      (-0.27) 
Broker, Industry-Year FE Included Included Included Included Included Included 
N 221,328 95,168 221,328 221,328 205,895 72,033 
Adj./Pseudo R-squared 0.161 0.023 0.421 0.479 0.335 0.411 
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Table IA1 (Cont’d) 
Information Sharing’s Effect on Analyst Performance and Investor Recognition:  
Controlling for Direct Coverage of Supplier and Customer Companies  
Panel B: Excluding Colleague with Direct Suppliers and Customers 
 
This panel reports the relation between an analyst’s performance and investor recognition in an industry and the 
economic connectedness of the industries covered by her colleague to that industry, excluding colleagues who cover 
direct suppliers and customers. We estimate the OLS regressions 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦(𝑅𝑒𝑐_𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡, 𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡_𝐶𝐴𝑅) =
𝑓(𝐼𝑛𝑑_𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑐𝑡_𝑁𝑜𝐷𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡, 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙_𝐴𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡, 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙_𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚) + 𝜀  in columns (1), (2) and (5), 
𝐼𝑛𝑑_𝑀𝑉(𝐼𝑛𝑑_𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑞) = 𝑓(𝐼𝑛𝑑_𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑐𝑡_𝑁𝑜𝐷𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡, 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙_𝐴𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡)   +𝜀  in columns (3) and (4), and the Probit 
regression 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑟 = 𝑓(𝐼𝑛𝑑_𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑐𝑡_𝑁𝑜𝐷𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡, 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙_𝐴𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡, 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙_𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚, 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙_𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑟)   + 𝜀 in column (6). 
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙_𝐴𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡  includes 𝐵𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 , 𝐼𝑛𝑑_𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑟 , 𝑁𝐼𝑛𝑑 , and 𝑁𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 ; 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙_𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚  includes 𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑞 , 𝐻𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑧𝑜𝑛 , 𝑀𝑉 , 
𝑀𝑇𝐵 , and 𝑅𝑂𝐴 ; 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙_𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑟 includes 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦 , 𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑚 , and 𝐵𝑜𝑙𝑑 . t and z-stats based on standard errors 
estimated clustered by analyst and industry-year are reported in parentheses below the coefficients. *, **, and *** indicate 
two-tailed significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Variable definitions are in the Appendix of the main 
paper and Table IA5 of the Internet Appendix. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Variable Accuracy Rec_Profit Ind_MV Ind_Freq Report_CAR Star 
Ind_Connect_NoDirect 1.6228*** 1.1955* 0.3228 0.9014** 0.0024*** 0.2640*** 
 (4.42) (1.91) (0.64) (1.99) (4.59) (2.67) 
BSize -0.0245*** -0.0035 0.0077 -0.0275*** 0.0000*** 0.0032*** 
 (-4.73) (-0.40) (0.83) (-4.27) (3.31) (4.31) 
Ind_Expr 0.0322* -0.0029 1.0321*** 0.8057*** -0.0001** 0.1141*** 
 (1.71) (-0.11) (19.44) (26.27) (-2.27) (26.67) 
NInd 0.2216*** 0.1787** -0.3935*** 0.9363*** 0.0000 0.0618*** 
 (5.39) (2.58) (-4.96) (15.07) (0.26) (4.52) 
NFirm 0.0879*** 0.0759** 4.9337*** 7.4016*** 0.0002*** 0.0171** 
 (3.77) (1.99) (24.57) (53.78) (3.33) (2.46) 
Freq 0.3425*** 0.4621***   0.0009*** 0.0133*** 
 (7.04) (6.10)   (10.89) (10.43) 
Horizon -0.1397*** -0.0136***   0.0000*** -0.0013*** 
 (-87.57) (-7.21)   (2.76) (-7.65) 
MV -0.3684*** 0.3453***   -0.0042*** 0.1431*** 
 (-6.87) (4.11)   (-28.96) (9.90) 
MTB 0.0484*** -0.0317   0.0003*** -0.0022 
 (3.10) (-1.43)   (5.54) (-0.68) 
ROA 5.7958*** 1.9163*   -0.0411*** -0.3465* 
 (7.68) (1.89)   (-17.00) (-1.78) 
Accuracy      0.0025*** 
      (4.78) 
Optimism      -0.0469 
      (-1.46) 
Bold      -0.0001 
      (-0.22) 
Broker FE Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Industry-Year FE Included Included Included Included Included Included 
N 221,328 95,168 221,328 221,328 205,895 72,033 
Adj./Pseudo R-squared  0.161 0.023 0.418 0.479 0.335 0.411 
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Information Sharing’s Effect on Analyst Performance and Investor Recognition:  
Controlling for Analyst Fixed Effects  
 
This table reports the relation between an analyst’s performance and investor recognition in an industry and the 
economic connectedness of the industries covered by her colleague to that industry controlling analyst fixed effects. We 
estimate the OLS regressions 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦(𝑅𝑒𝑐_𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡, 𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡_𝐶𝐴𝑅) = 𝑓(𝐼𝑛𝑑_𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑐𝑡, 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙_𝐴𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡,
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙_𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚) + 𝜀 in columns (1), (2) and (5), 𝐼𝑛𝑑_𝑀𝑉(𝐼𝑛𝑑_𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑞) = 𝑓(𝐼𝑛𝑑_𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑐𝑡, 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙_𝐴𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡) + 𝜀 in 
columns (3) and (4), and the Probit regression 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑟 = 𝑓(𝐼𝑛𝑑_𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑐𝑡, 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙_𝐴𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡, 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙_𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚,
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙_𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑟) + 𝜀 in column (6). 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙_𝐴𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡 includes 𝐵𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 , 𝐼𝑛𝑑_𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑟 , 𝑁𝐼𝑛𝑑 , and 𝑁𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 ; 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙_𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 
includes 𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑞, 𝐻𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑧𝑜𝑛, 𝑀𝑉, 𝑀𝑇𝐵, and 𝑅𝑂𝐴; 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙_𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑟 includes 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦, 𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑚, and 𝐵𝑜𝑙𝑑. t and z-stats 
based on standard errors estimated clustered by analyst and industry-year are reported in parentheses below the 
coefficients. *, **, and *** indicate two-tailed significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Variable 
definitions are in the Appendix of the main paper. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Variable Accuracy Rec_Profit Ind_MV Ind_Freq Report_CAR Star 
Ind_Connect 1.0591*** 1.1793* 1.0781** 2.2657*** 0.0030*** 0.6536*** 
 (2.67) (1.67) (2.36) (5.60) (5.67) (3.98) 
BSize -0.0005 -0.0159** 0.0022 0.0131*** 0.0000*** 0.0086*** 
 (-0.13) (-2.58) (0.53) (3.12) (3.44) (8.88) 
Ind_Expr -0.1100*** -0.0335 1.0271*** 0.8037*** -0.0002*** 0.0277*** 
 (-3.91) (-0.68) (22.47) (22.40) (-4.77) (2.69) 
NInd 0.0606 0.0563 -0.0930 1.5353*** 0.0002** 0.0096 
 (1.02) (0.49) (-1.44) (21.97) (2.12) (0.39) 
NFirm 0.1149*** 0.0969** 5.4721*** 7.8531*** 0.0003*** 0.0184 
 (4.25) (2.01) (52.74) (62.53) (6.96) (1.49) 
Freq 0.4113*** 0.4856***   0.0010*** 0.0240*** 
 (7.87) (5.80)   (12.43) (11.27) 
Horizon -0.1384*** -0.0124***   0.0000*** -0.0018*** 
 (-88.29) (-6.27)   (4.41) (-6.32) 
MV -0.3480*** 0.4090***   -0.0046*** 0.0824*** 
 (-5.52) (3.77)   (-33.51) (3.49) 
MTB 0.0246 -0.0518**   0.0002*** 0.0020 
 (1.64) (-1.97)   (4.00) (0.41) 
ROA 5.3376*** 1.1242   -0.0324*** -0.3528 
 (6.57) (0.87)   (-14.78) (-1.15) 
Accuracy      0.0022** 
      (2.31) 
Optimism      0.1029* 
      (1.96) 
Bold      -0.0007 
      (-0.79) 
Analyst FE Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Industry-Year FE Included Included Included Included Included Included 
N 217,700 92,790 217,632 217,632 202,809 19,761 
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Information Sharing’s Effect on Analyst Performance and Investor Recognition:  
Excluding Broker Fixed Effects  
 
This table reports the relation between an analyst’s performance and investor recognition in an industry and the 
economic connectedness of the industries covered by her colleague to that industry excluding broker fixed effects. We 
estimate the OLS regressions 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦(𝑅𝑒𝑐_𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡, 𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡_𝐶𝐴𝑅) = 𝑓(𝐼𝑛𝑑_𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑐𝑡, 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙_𝐴𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡,
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙_𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚) + 𝜀 in columns (1), (2) and (5), 𝐼𝑛𝑑_𝑀𝑉(𝐼𝑛𝑑_𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑞) = 𝑓(𝐼𝑛𝑑_𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑐𝑡, 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙_𝐴𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡) + 𝜀 in 
columns (3) and (4), and the Probit regression 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑟 = 𝑓(𝐼𝑛𝑑_𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑐𝑡, 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙_𝐴𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡, 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙_𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚,
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙_𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑟) + 𝜀 in column (6). 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙_𝐴𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡 includes 𝐵𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 , 𝐼𝑛𝑑_𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑟 , 𝑁𝐼𝑛𝑑 , and 𝑁𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 ; 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙_𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 
includes 𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑞, 𝐻𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑧𝑜𝑛, 𝑀𝑉, 𝑀𝑇𝐵, and 𝑅𝑂𝐴; 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙_𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑟 includes 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦, 𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑚, and 𝐵𝑜𝑙𝑑. t and z-stats 
based on standard errors estimated clustered by analyst and industry-year are reported in parentheses below the 
coefficients. *, **, and *** indicate two-tailed significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Variable 
definitions are in the Appendix of the main paper. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Variable Accuracy Rec_Profit Ind_MV Ind_Freq Report_CAR Star 
Ind_Connect 2.9072*** 0.7172* 2.2536*** 4.4894*** 0.0040*** 0.5823*** 
 (8.52) (1.72) (2.89) (10.16) (7.37) (5.76) 
BSize -0.0043 -0.0017 0.0741*** 0.0208*** 0.0000 0.0080*** 
 (-1.61) (-0.48) (10.48) (5.98) (0.00) (18.43) 
Ind_Expr 0.1728*** -0.0104 1.0690*** 0.9598*** 0.0000 0.0974*** 
 (8.34) (-0.45) (15.16) (29.22) (1.07) (23.31) 
NInd 0.0730 0.0938 -0.6447*** 0.5005*** -0.0002** 0.0104 
 (1.64) (1.62) (-6.07) (7.72) (-2.54) (0.82) 
NFirm 0.0809*** 0.0566 4.9680*** 7.3794*** 0.0003*** -0.0060 
 (3.38) (1.49) (23.75) (52.66) (3.73) (-0.81) 
Freq 0.5222*** 0.4608***   0.0011*** 0.0152*** 
 (10.36) (5.75)   (12.72) (11.32) 
Horizon -0.1420*** -0.0138***   0.0000* -0.0015*** 
 (-88.65) (-7.31)   (1.75) (-9.45) 
MV -0.6732*** 0.3719***   -0.0047*** 0.2195*** 
 (-12.65) (5.24)   (-32.11) (15.28) 
MTB 0.0749*** -0.0222   0.0004*** -0.0035 
 (4.59) (-1.19)   (6.41) (-1.13) 
ROA 5.3047*** 2.0966**   -0.0441*** -0.3157* 
 (6.86) (2.32)   (-18.36) (-1.69) 
Accuracy      0.0027*** 
      (5.70) 
Optimism      -0.0219 
      (-0.75) 
Bold      0.0007 
      (1.41) 
Industry-Year FE Included Included Included Included Included Included 
N 221,328 95,315 221,328 221,328 205,925 72,035 
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Information Sharing’s Effect on Analyst Performance and Investor Recognition:  
Change Specification  
 
This table reports the relation between an analyst’s performance and investor recognition in an industry and the 
economic connectedness of the industries covered by her colleague to that industry using a change specification. We 
estimate the OLS regressions ∆𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦(∆𝑅𝑒𝑐_𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡, ∆𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡_𝐶𝐴𝑅) = 𝑓(∆𝐼𝑛𝑑_𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑐𝑡,
∆𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙_𝐴𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡, ∆𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙_𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚) + 𝜀  in columns (1), (2) and (5), ∆𝐼𝑛𝑑_𝑀𝑉(∆𝐼𝑛𝑑_𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑞) =
𝑓(∆𝐼𝑛𝑑_𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑐𝑡, ∆𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙_𝐴𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡) + 𝜀  in columns (3) and (4), and ∆𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑟 = 𝑓(∆𝐼𝑛𝑑_𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑐𝑡,
∆𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙_𝐴𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡, ∆𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙_𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚, ∆𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙_𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑟) + 𝜀  in column (6). 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙_𝐴𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡  includes 𝐵𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 , 
𝐼𝑛𝑑_𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑟, 𝑁𝐼𝑛𝑑, and 𝑁𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚; 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙_𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 includes 𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑞, 𝐻𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑧𝑜𝑛, 𝑀𝑉, 𝑀𝑇𝐵, and 𝑅𝑂𝐴; 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙_𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑟 includes 
𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦, 𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑚, and 𝐵𝑜𝑙𝑑. t and z-stats based on standard errors estimated clustered by analyst and industry-
year are reported in parentheses below the coefficients. *, **, and *** indicate two-tailed significance at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% levels, respectively. Variable definitions are in the Appendix of the main paper. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Variable ∆Accuracy ∆Rec_Profit ∆Ind_MV ∆Ind_Freq ∆Report_CAR ∆Star 
∆Ind_Connect -0.0205 2.6407* 0.9775*** 0.9642* 0.0037*** 0.0235** 
 (-0.03) (1.75) (3.32) (1.71) (3.90) (2.02) 
∆BSize 0.0207* -0.0351 0.0089** 0.0308*** -0.0000 -0.0004*** 
 (1.84) (-1.52) (1.97) (3.54) (-0.25) (-2.86) 
∆NInd 0.4619*** 0.3747 0.4184*** 3.0653*** 0.0005*** 0.0014 
 (4.44) (1.48) (11.09) (41.51) (5.07) (0.69) 
∆NFirm 0.1936*** -0.0110 5.2869*** 9.9257*** 0.0006*** -0.0012 
 (3.49) (-0.10) (132.09) (161.49) (8.93) (-1.38) 
∆Freq 0.5999*** 0.6175***   0.0007*** 0.0008*** 
 (9.90) (4.63)   (11.53) (5.91) 
∆Horizon -0.1242*** -0.0001   0.0000*** 0.0001*** 
 (-88.72) (-0.02)   (6.53) (4.81) 
∆MV 0.1246 -0.0733   -0.0055*** 0.0019 
 (0.84) (-0.26)   (-31.01) (1.08) 
∆MTB 0.0187 -0.0040   -0.0000 -0.0000 
 (1.15) (-0.12)   (-0.56) (-0.02) 
∆ROA 3.5046*** 2.0494   -0.0229*** -0.0226 
 (2.61) (0.79)   (-12.80) (-1.31) 
∆Accuracy      0.0000 
      (0.19) 
∆Optimism      -0.0021 
      (-0.73) 
∆Bold      0.0000 
      (0.13) 
Intercept -2.3025*** -0.3354 -0.1148*** -1.3005*** 0.0008*** -0.0159*** 
 (-22.06) (-1.39) (-3.26) (-19.03) (8.24) (-10.72) 
N 139,679 48,242 139,679 139,679 130,281 40,984 
Adj. R-squared 0.093 0.001 0.207 0.214 0.020 0.002 
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Table IA5: Definition of variables used in the Internet Appendix  
This table describes the calculation of variables used only in this internet appendix.  The variables used also in the core 
analysis are described in Appendix of main paper.   
 
Variable Definition 
DirectSC_Selfl,i,t The number of analyst l’s covered companies in industry i in year t that have a direct 
supplier or customer relationship with other companies covered by analyst l in year t.  
DirectSC_Colleaguel,i,t The number of analyst l’s covered companies in industry i in year t that have a direct 
supplier or customer relationship with companies covered by analyst l’s colleagues in 
year t. 
Ind_Connect_NoDirectl,i,t The sum of the importance to industry i of industries covered by other analysts who 
work in the same brokerage as analyst l in year t, except those who cover a firm that is a 
direct supplier or customer of a firm covered by analyst l in year t in industry i. The 
importance of industry j to industry i in year t is the ratio of the sum of industry i’s input 
commodities made by industry j and industry i’s output commodities used by industry j 




𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑘 𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑑 𝑏𝑦 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑖×% 𝑜𝑓 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑘 𝑚𝑎𝑑𝑒 𝑏𝑦 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑗+
𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑘 𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑑 𝑏𝑦 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑗×% 𝑜𝑓 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑘 𝑚𝑎𝑑𝑒 𝑏𝑦 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑖
)𝑘
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